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 Is Anybody Still a Jeffrey W. Legro and
 Realist? Andrew Moravcsik
 Realism, the oldest
 and most prominent theoretical paradigm in international relations, is in
 trouble. The problem is not lack of interest. Realism remains the primary or
 alternative theory in virtually every major book and article addressing general
 theories of world politics, particularly in security affairs. Controversies be-
 tween neorealism and its critics continue to dominate international relations
 theory debates. Nor is the problem realism's purported inability to make point
 predictions. Many specific realist theories are testable, and there remains much
 global conflict about which realism offers powerful insights. Nor is the problem
 the lack of empirical support for simple realist predictions, such as recurrent
 balancing; or the absence of plausible realist explanations of certain salient
 phenomena, such as the Cold War, the "end of history,"lor systemic change in
 general. Research programs advance, after all, by the refinement and improve-
 ment of previous theories to account for anomalies. There can be little doubt
 that realist theories rightfully retain a salient position in international relations
 theory
 Jeffrey W. Legro is Associate Professor of Government and Foreign Affairs, University of Virginia. Andrew
 Moravcsik is Professor of Government, Harvard University.
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 1. We agree with much of the analysis in John Vasquez, "The Realist Paradigm and Degenerative
 vs. Progressive Research Programs: An Appraisal of Neotraditional Research on Waltz's Balancing
 Proposition," American Political Science Review, Vol. 91, No. 4 (December 1997), pp. 899-912. But we
 do not agree, among other things, that balancing behavior per se provides a strong test of realism
 or that realism is beyond redemption. On various criticisms, see also Francis Fukuyama, The End
 of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press, 1992); Richard Ned Lebow and Thomas
 Risse-Kappen, eds., International Relations and the End of the Cold War (New York: Columbia
 University Press, 1995); and Paul W. Schroeder, "Historical Reality vs. Neorealist Theory," in
 Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, eds., The Perils of Anarchy: Contem-
 porary Realism and International Security (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1995), pp. 421-461; Peter J.
 Katzenstein, Robert 0. Keohane, and Stephen D. Krasner, "International Organization and the Study
 of World Politics," International Organization, Vol. 52, No. 4 (Autumn 1998), pp. 670-674; and
 Initernationial Security, Vol. 24, No. 2 (Fall 1999), pp. 5-55
 ? 1999 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
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 The central problem is instead that the theoretical core of the realist approach
 has been undermined by its own defenders-in particular so-called defensive
 and neoclassical realists-who seek to address anomalies by recasting realism
 in forms that are theoretically less determinate, less coherent, and less distinc-
 tive to realism. Realists like E.H. Carr, Hans Morgenthau, and Kenneth Waltz
 sought to highlight the manipulation, accumulation, and balancing of power
 by sober unsentimental statesmen, focusing above all on the limits imposed
 on states by the international distribution of material resources. They viewed
 realism as the bulwark against claims about the autonomous influence of
 democracy, ideology, economic integration, law, and institutions on world
 politics. Many recent realists, by contrast, seek to redress empirical anomalies,
 particularly in Waltz's neorealism, by subsuming these traditional counterar-
 guments. The result is that many realists now advance the very assumptions
 and causal claims in opposition to which they traditionally, and still, claim to
 define themselves.
 This expansion would be unproblematic, even praiseworthy, if it took place
 on the basis of the further elaboration of an unchanging set of core realist
 premises. It would be quite an intellectual coup for realists to demonstrate-as
 realists from Thucydides through Machiavelli and Hobbes to Morgenthau
 sought to do-that the impact of ideas, domestic institutions, economic inter-
 dependence, and international institutions actually reflects the exogenous
 distribution and manipulation of interstate power capabilities. Some contem-
 porary realists do continue to cultivate such arguments, yet such efforts appear
 today more like exceptions to the rule. Many among the most prominent and
 thoughtful contemporary realists invoke instead variation in other exogenous
 influences on state behavior-state preferences, beliefs, and international insti-
 tutions-to trump the direct and indirect effects of material power. Such factors
 are consistently treated as more important than power. We term such an ap-
 proach "minimal realism," because it retains only two core assumptions-little
 more than anarchy and rationality-neither of which is distinctively realist. By
 Benjamin Frankel, ed., Realism: Restatements and Renewal (London: Frank Cass, 1996), pp. xi-xii.
 For rejoinders, see Kenneth N. Waltz, "Evaluating Theories," American Political Science Review, Vol.
 91, No. 4 (December 1997), pp. 913-918; Thomas J. Christensen and Jack Snyder, "Progressive
 Research and Degenerative Alliances," American Political Science Review, Vol. 91, No. 4 (December
 1997), pp. 899-912; Colin Elman and Miriam Fendius Elman, "Correspondence: History vs. Neo-
 realism: A Second Look," International Security, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Summer 1995), pp. 182-193; Elman
 and Elman, "Lakatos and Neorealism: A Reply to Vasquez," American Political Science Review, Vol.
 91, No. 4 (December 1997), pp. 923-926; Randall L. Schweller, "New Realist Research on Alliances:
 Refining, not Refuting, Waltz's Balancing Proposition," American Political Science Review, Vol. 91,
 No. 4 (December 1997), pp. 927-930; and Stephen M. Walt, "The Progressive Power of Realism,"
 American Political Science Review, Vol. 91, No. 4 (December 1997), pp. 931-935.
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 reducing realist core assumptions to anarchy and rationality, minimal realism
 broadens realism so far that it is now consistent with any influence on rational
 state behavior, including those once uniformly disparaged by realists as "le-
 galist," "liberal," "moralist," or "idealist." The concept of "realism" has thus
 been stretched to include assumptions and causal mechanisms within alterna-
 tive paradigms, albeit with no effort to reconcile the resulting contradictions.2
 Contemporary realists lack an explicit nontrivial set of core assumptions. Those
 they set forth either are not distinctive to realism or are overtly contradicted
 by their own midrange theorizing. In sum, the malleable realist rubric now
 encompasses nearly the entire universe of international relations theory (in-
 cluding current liberal, epistemic, and institutionalist theories) and excludes
 only a few intellectual scarecrows (such as outright irrationality, widespread
 self-abnegating altruism, slavish commitment to ideology, complete harmony
 of state interests, or a world state).
 The practical result is that the use of the term "realist" misleads us as to the
 actual import of recent empirical research. The mislabeling of realist claims has
 obscured the major-and ironic-achievement of recent realist work, namely
 to deepen and broaden the proven explanatory power and scope of the estab-
 lished liberal, epistemic, and institutionalist paradigms. The more precise the
 midrange theories and hypotheses contemporary realists advance, the clearer
 it becomes that such claims are not realist. Some subsume in a theoretically
 unconstrained way nearly all potential rationalist hypotheses about state be-
 havior except those based on irrational or incoherent behavior. Others rely
 explicitly on variation in exogenous factors like democratic governance,
 economic interdependence, systematic misperception, the transaction cost-
 reducing properties of international institutions, organizational politics, and
 aggressive ideology This is obscured because most realists test their favored
 explanations only against other variants of realism-normally Waltzian neo-
 realism-rather than against alternative liberal, epistemic, and institutionalist
 theories, as they once did. Recent realist scholarship unwittingly throws the
 realist baby out with the neorealist bathwater.
 Our criticism of recent realist theory is not a semantic quibble, an invitation
 to yet another purely abstract debate about the labeling and relabeling of
 2. Giovanni Sartori, "Concept Misinformation in Comparative Politics," American Political Science
 Review, Vol. 64, No. 4 (December 1970), pp. 1033-1053. This is another way in which our critique
 differs from that of Vasquez, who has also charged that the realist paradigm is degenerating.
 Vasquez argues that "there is no falsification before the emergence of better theory," and that
 alternative paradigms do not exist. We demonstrate that they do. Vasquez, "The Realist Paradigm,"
 p. 910.
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 international relations ideal-types, or a philosophical inquiry into the develop-
 ment of research paradigms. It is a direct challenge to the theoretical distinct-
 iveness of contemporary realism, one with immediate and significant practical
 implications. Recent realist theory has become a hindrance rather than a help
 in structuring theoretical debates, guiding empirical research, and shaping
 both pedagogy and public discussion. It no longer helps to signal the analyst's
 adherence to specific deeper assumptions implicated in any empirical expla-
 nation of concrete events in world politics.
 If such complete confusion is possible, some might be tempted to reject
 realism-and perhaps with it, all "isms" in international relations theory-as
 inherently vague, indeterminate, contradictory, or just plain wrong.3 This is an
 understandable response, but it is, at the very least, premature. Although
 battles among abstract "isms" can often be arid, the specification of well-
 developed paradigms around sets of core assumptions remains central to the
 study of world politics. By unambiguously linking specific claims to common
 core assumptions, paradigms assist us in developing coherent explanations,
 structuring social scientific debates, considering a full range of explanatory
 options, defining the scope of particular claims, understanding how different
 theories and hypotheses relate to one another, and clarifying the implications
 of specific findings. While realism is not the only basic international relations
 theory in need of clarification, its long history and central position in the field
 make it an especially important focus for theory, research, pedagogy, and
 policy analysis. No other paradigm so succinctly captures the essence of an
 enduring mode of interstate interaction based on the manipulation of material
 power-one with a venerable history.4 And it need not be incoherent. Accord-
 ingly, we shall propose not a rejection but a reformulation of realism in three
 assumptions-a reformulation that highlights the distinctive focus of realism
 on conflict and material power.
 This article proceeds in three sections. We begin by elaborating the desirable
 qualities of a theoretical paradigm in international relations and, guided by
 these criteria, propose a formulation of realism that we believe captures its
 enduring essence. We then document the theoretical degeneration of recent
 "minimal realist" theory We conclude by highlighting the practical advantages
 3. Vasquez, "The Realist Paradigm"; and David A. Lake and Robert Powell, eds., Strategic Choice
 and International Relations (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1999).
 4. Jared Diamond, Guns, Germs, and Steel: The Fates of Human Societies (New York: W.W. Norton,
 1997).
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 for theoretical debate and empirical research of consistently adhering to a
 narrower and more rigorous reformulation of the realist paradigm.
 Realism as a Theoretical Paradigm
 Realism, many have observed, is not a single theory but a family of theories-a
 "paradigm."5 Nearly all scholars who have voiced an opinion on the subject
 over the past quarter century agree that what makes it possible and useful to
 speak about realism as a unified paradigm is the existence of a series of shared
 core assumptions. In this section, we first discuss desirable attributes of a set
 of core assumptions, then offer an appropriate reformulation of realism.
 Whether a paradigm is conceptually productive depends on at least two
 related criteria, coherence and distinctiveness.6 First and least controversial, a
 paradigm must be logically coherent. It must not contain internal logical
 contradictions that permit the unambiguous derivation of contradictory con-
 clusions. To be sure, given their breadth, paradigms are likely to be incomplete.
 The use of differing auxiliary assumptions may thus generate multiple, even
 contradictory, propositions. But there must be a constraint on such deriva-
 tions.7 When theoretical explanation of empirical findings within a paradigm
 consistently relies on auxiliary assumptions unconnected to core assumptions
 to predict novel facts or clear up anomalies, we learn little about the veracity
 of those assumptions. When it relies on auxiliary assumptions contradictory to
 underlying core assumptions, our confidence in those core assumptions should
 weaken.8
 5. Or a "basic theory," "research program," "school," or "approach." For similar usage, see Stephen
 Van Evera, cited in Benjamin Frankel, "Restating the Realist Case," in Frankel, Realism, p. xiii; and
 Walt, "The Progressive Power of Realism." We do not mean to imply more with the term "para-
 digm" than we state.
 6. For a fuller account of the desirable criteria, see Jeffrey Legro and Andrew Moravcsik, "Is
 Anybody Still a Realist?" Weatherhead Center for International Affairs Working Paper Series
 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University, 1998). There we also employ these standards to reject
 paradigmatic definitions of realism based on ideal-typical outcomes (e.g., "pessimism" or
 "conflict"), vague concepts (e.g., "power and interest"), intellectual history, or outcomes predicted
 by more than one theory (e.g., "balancing").
 7. Our central criticism of recent realism is not that the realist paradigm is incoherent or indistinct
 simply because it generates various, even conflicting, theories and hypotheses. We do not believe
 that disagreement among realists per se is a sign of degeneration. See Walt, "The Progressive Power
 of Realism," pp. 932-933.
 8. See Imre Lakatos, "Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programs," in
 Lakatos and Alan Musgrave, eds., Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge (Cambridge: Cambridge
 University Press, 1970), pp. 131-132.
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 Second and more important for our purposes here, a paradigm must be
 distinct. Its assumptions must clearly differentiate it from recognized theoreti-
 cal alternatives. Paradigmatic formulations must make sense not only on their
 own terms, but also within the context of broader social scientific debates.9
 Only in this way can we speak meaningfully of testing theories and hypotheses
 drawn from different paradigms against one another, or about the empirical
 progress or degeneration of a paradigm over time. The appropriate level of
 generality, number of assumptions, and empirical scope of a paradigm are not,
 therefore, qualities intrinsic to any single paradigm, but depend on the schol-
 arly debate in which the paradigm is employed.
 Realism coexists in a theoretical world with at least three paradigmatic
 alternatives for which core assumptions can been elaborated. The first, the
 institutionalist paradigm, contains theories and explanations that stress the role
 of international institutions, norms, and information. Examples include the
 transaction cost-based analyses of functional regime theorists and, perhaps,
 the sociological institutionalism espoused by some constructivists.10
 The second alternative, the liberal paradigm, contains theories and explana-
 tions that stress the role of exogenous variation in underlying state preferences
 embedded in domestic and transnational state-society relations. Paradigmatic
 liberal assumptions underlie most of what are referred to as "second-image"
 (and many "second-image reversed") theories. Examples include claims about
 the autonomous impact of economic interdependence, domestic representative
 institutions, and social compromises concerning the proper provision of public
 goods such as ethnic identity, regulatory protection, socioeconomic redistribu-
 tion, and political regime type.11
 9. Fundamental debates are always (at least) "three-cornered," pitting two (or more) theories
 against the data. See ibid., p. 115.
 10. For a statement of core assumptions, see Robert 0. Keohane, International Institutions and State
 Power (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1989); Stephen D. Krasner, ed., International Regimes (Ithaca, N.Y:
 Cornell University Press, 1983); and Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World
 Political Economy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984).
 11. For a statement of core assumptions, see Andrew Moravcsik, "Taking Preferences Seriously: A
 Liberal Theory of International Politics," International Organization, Vol. 51, No. 4 (Autumn 1997),
 pp. 513-553. Helen V Milner, "Rationalizing Politics: The Emerging Synthesis of International,
 American, and Comparative Politics," International Organization, Vol. 52, No. 4 (Autumn 1998),
 pp. 759-786; Robert 0. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in
 Transition (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977); Michael W. Doyle, "Liberalism and World Politics," Ameri-
 can Political Science Review, Vol. 80, No. 4 (December 1986), pp. 1151-1169; Richard Cooper, The
 Economics of Interdependence: Economic Policy in the Atlantic Community (New York: Columbia
 University Press, 1968); and Elman and Elman, "Correspondence," p. 924, all concur that such
 theories are nonrealist.
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 The third less, well-articulated, alternative, the epistemic paradigm, contains
 theories and explanations about the role of collective beliefs and ideas on
 which states rely in calculating how to realize their underlying goals.12 In
 contrast to liberal theories (which stress the way the ideas shared or manipu-
 lated by groups influence state preferences and policy) and institutionalist
 theories (which stress the role of formal norms and institutions in providing
 information to states), the epistemic paradigm stresses exogenous variation in
 the shared beliefs that structure means-ends calculations and affect perceptions
 of the strategic environment.13 Examples include many arguments about cul-
 ture (strategic, organizational, economic, and industrial), policy paradigms in
 particular issue areas, group misperception, standard operating procedures,
 and some types of social learning.14
 A paradigm is only as powerful and useful as its ability to rule out plausible
 competing assumptions and explanations about the world. Enduring interna-
 tional relations paradigms have helped to focus our attention on particular core
 assumptions and causal mechanisms. Debates among realists, liberals,
 epistemic theorists, and institutionalists have traditionally centered around the
 scope, power, and interrelationship of variation in material capabilities (real-
 ism), national preferences (liberalism), beliefs (epistemic theory), and interna-
 tional institutions (institutionalism) on state behavior. A formulation of realism
 12. An "episteme" or "system of understanding" implies a collective mentality and should be
 distinguished from purely psychological approaches about individual perceptions and personality
 traits, although these may share similarities. Our use of the word seeks to situate the paradigm
 between deep constitutive connotations of "social episteme" in John G. Ruggie, "Territoriality and
 Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in International Relations," International Organization, Vol. 47,
 No. 4 (Winter 1993), p. 157, and interest-group focus of "epistemic community" in Peter M. Haas,
 "Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination," International Or-
 ganization, Vol. 46, No. 1 (Winter 1992), pp. 1-35.
 13. On the role of beliefs in rationalist theory, see Jon Elster, "Introduction," in Elster, ed., Rational
 Choice (New York: New York University Press, 1986), pp. 1-33; and Arthur Denzau and Douglass
 North, "Shared Mental Models: Ideologies and Institutions," Kyklos, Vol. 47, No. 1 (Spring 1994),
 pp. 3-31.
 14. John Odell, U.S. International Monetary Policy: Markets, Power, and Ideas as Sources of Change
 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1982); Paul Egon Rohrlich, "Economic Culture and
 Foreign Policy," International Organization, Vol. 41, No. 1 (Winter 1987), pp. 61-92; Kathryn Sikkink,
 Ideas and Institutions: Developmentalism in Brazil and Argentina (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press,
 1991); Peter Hall, "Policy Paradigms, Social Learning, and the State," Comparative Politics, Vol. 25,
 No. 3 (April 1993), pp. 275-295; Judith Goldstein, Ideas, Interests, and American Trade Policy (Ithaca,
 N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1993); Alastair lain Johnston, Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and
 Grand Strategy in Chinese History (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995); Jeffrey W.
 Legro, Cooperation under Fire: Anglo-German Restraint during World War II (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell
 University Press, 1995); Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of National Security: Norms, Identity,
 and World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996); Dan Reiter, Crucible of Beliefs
 (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1996); and Elizabeth Kier, Imagining War: French and British
 Military Doctrine between the Wars (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1997).
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 that subsumed all the core assumptions underlying these other theories would
 be a misleading guide to theoretical debate or empirical research. Perpetually
 underspecified, perhaps internally contradictory, such a formulation would
 evade rather than encourage potentially falsifying theoretical counterclaims,
 thereby defeating the basic purpose of grouping theories under paradigms in
 the first place. Surely realism, with its enduring commitment to the statesman-
 like manipulation of conflict and power, is more than just a generic form of
 rationalism. Realism must therefore remain distinct from its liberal, epistemic,
 and institutionalist counterparts.
 REALISM AS A PARADIGM: THREE CORE ASSUMPTIONS
 Many among the most prominent contemporary forms of realism lack both
 coherence and distinctiveness. To see precisely why and how this is so, how-
 ever, we must first demonstrate that a coherent, distinct formulation of the core
 assumptions underlying the realist paradigm is possible, practical, and pro-
 ductive. Three "core" assumptions are necessary and sufficient for this pur-
 pose. Our formulation comprises the essential elements of a social scientific
 theory, namely assumptions about actors, agency, and structural constraint.15
 Though few if any formulations in the realist literature are identical to this one,
 many overlap.16
 ASSUMPTION 1-THE NATURE OF THE ACTORS: RATIONAL, UNITARY POLITICAL
 UNITS IN ANARCHY. The first and least controversial assumption of realism
 concerns the nature of basic social actors. Realism assumes the existence of a
 set of "conflict groups," each organized as a unitary political actor that ration-
 ally pursues distinctive goals within an anarchic setting. Within each territorial
 jurisdiction, each actor is a sovereign entity able to undertake unitary action.
 Between jurisdictions, anarchy (no sovereign power) persists. Realists assume,
 moreover, that these sovereign conflict groups are rational, in the conventional
 sense that they select a strategy by choosing the most efficient available means
 to achieve their ends, subject to constraints imposed by environmental uncer-
 tainty and incomplete information.17
 15. James S. Coleman, Foundations of Social Theory (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press,
 1990).
 16. Randall L. Schweller and David Priess suggest this definition, although they neglect it in their
 midrange theorizing. Schweller and Priess, "A Tale of Two Realisms: Expanding the Institutions
 Debate," International Studies Review, Vol. 41, No. 1 (1997), pp. 1-32. Walt comes close in Walt, "The
 Progressive Power of Realism," p. 932. For an all-inclusive definition including many of these
 elements, see Frankel, "Restating the Realist Case."
 17. Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979), p. 94;
 Stephen D. Krasner, Structural Conflict: The Third World against Global Liberalism (Berkeley: Univer-
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 What is essential to the logic of realist theory is not the particular scope of
 the actors, but the ability to draw a sharp distinction between anarchy among
 actors and hierarchy within them. As Kenneth Waltz, Robert Gilpin, and many
 others have noted, under other historical circumstances one might replace
 states with tribes, domains, principalities, city-states, regional political unions,
 or whatever other conflict group enjoys a monopoly of legitimate force within
 territorial jurisdictions. In modern international relations, the state is generally
 accepted as the dominant form of political order able to pursue a unitary
 foreign policy.18
 ASSUMPTION 2-THE NATURE OF STATE PREFERENCES: FIXED AND UNIFORMLY
 CONFLICTUAL GOALS. The second realist assumption is that state preferences
 are fixed and uniformly conflictual.19 Interstate politics is thus a perpetual
 interstate bargaining game over the distribution and redistribution of scarce
 resources. Much of the power of realist theory, leading realists like Carr,
 Morgenthau, and Waltz consistently maintained, comes from the assumption
 that state preferences are fixed. It is this assumption, they argue, that releases
 us from the "reductionist" temptation to seek the causes of state behavior in
 the messy process of domestic preference formation, from the "moralist" temp-
 tation to expect that ideas influence the material structure of world politics,
 from the "utopian" temptation to believe that any given group of states have
 naturally harmonious interests, and from the "legalist" temptation to believe
 that states can overcome power politics by submitting disputes to common
 rules and institutions.20
 sity of California Press, 1985), p. 28; Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for
 Power and Peace (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1973), pp. 7-8; Robert Gilpin, "No One Loves a
 Political Realist," in Frankel, Realism, p. 7; and Robert 0. Keohane, "Realism, Neorealism, and the
 Study of World Politics," in Keohane, ed., Neorealism and Its Critics (New York: Columbia University
 Press, 1986), pp. 1-26. This rationality can be bounded; the precise level of calculating ability is
 inessential to our purposes here, as long as miscalculations are random; if they are not, then other
 theories may take over.
 18. Gilpin, "No One Loves a Political Realist"; and Kenneth N. Waltz, "Realist Thought and
 Neorealist Theory," in Robert L. Rothstein, ed., The Evolution of Theory in International Relations
 (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1991), p. 37.
 19. Preferences should remain clearly distinct from strategies. State preferences are defined over
 states of the social world and are therefore "prestrategic," that is, they remain uninfluenced by
 shifts in the strategic environment, such as the distribution of power. Preferences are akin to
 "tastes" that states bring to the international bargaining table, although they themselves may of
 course result from forms of international interaction other than those being studied, as do national
 preferences resulting from economic interdependence. See Robert Powell, "Anarchy in Interna-
 tional Relations Theory: The Neorealist-Neoliberal Debate," International Organization, Vol. 48, No.
 2 (Spring 1994), pp. 313-344; and Moravcsik, "Taking Preferences Seriously."
 20. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations, pp. 2-12; Waltz, Theory of International Politics, pp. 18-37;
 and Waltz, "Realist Thought and Neorealist Theory," pp. 21-37.
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 Despite their general agreement on the assumption of fixed preferences,
 realists display far less agreement about the precise nature of such preferences.
 Most assume only that, in Waltz's oft-cited phrase, states "at a minimum, seek
 their own preservation and, at a maximum, drive for universal domination"-
 an elastic assumption much criticized for its vagueness. Such an imprecise
 assumption negates the explanatory value of assuming fixed preferences.21
 From game theorists like Robert Powell to constructivists like Alexander
 Wendt, there is broad agreement that this does not constitute a sharp enough
 assumption about the nature of the state-that is, of its state-society relations
 and resulting state preferences-on which to build explanatory theory In a
 world of status quo states and positive-sum interactions, for example, tradi-
 tional realist behaviors may well not emerge at all. Lest we permit the entire
 range of liberal, epistemic, and institutional sources of varying state prefer-
 ences to enter into realist calculations, a narrower assumption is required.22
 We submit that a distinctive realist theory is therefore possible only if we
 assume the existence of high conflict among underlying state preferences-
 what John Mearsheimer labels a "fundamentally competitive" world and
 Joseph Grieco sees as one dominated by relative gains seeking (a high value
 of k).23 Only then does a rational government have a consistent incentive to
 employ costly means to compel others to heed its will. Only then, therefore,
 should we expect to observe recurrent power balancing, the overriding im-
 perative to exploit relative power, and (in extreme cases) concern about sur-
 v~ival and security, as well as other realist pathologies.24 In short, realists view
 21. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, p. 118.
 22. Powell, "Anarchy in International Relations Theory," p. 315; Alexander Wendt, "Social Theory
 of International Politics," unpublished manuscript, Dartmouth College, 1998, p. 309; Randall L.
 Schweller, "Neorealism's Status-Quo Bias: What Security Dilemma?" in Frankel, Realism; Moravc-
 sik, "Taking Preferences Seriously"; Jeffrey W. Legro, "Culture and Preferences in the International
 Cooperation Two-step," American Political Science Review, Vol. 90, No. 1 (March 1996), pp. 118-137;
 Barry Buzan, Charles Jones, and Richard Little, The Logic of Anarchy: Neorealism to Structural Realism
 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993); and John Gerard Ruggie, "International Regimes,
 Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order," in Krasner,
 International Regimes.
 23. John J. Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War," International
 Security, Vol. 15, No. 1 (Summer 1990), pp. 5-56; and Joseph M. Grieco, "Anarchy and the Limits
 of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism," International Organiza-
 tion, Vol. 42, No. 3 (Summer 1988), pp. 485-507. Grieco maintains that states seek both absolute
 and relative gains. The relative importance of relative gains is given by the coefficient k. The higher
 the value of k, Grieco maintains, the stronger the incentives for relative-gains seeking and the more
 pronounced the tendency to engage in "defensive positionalist" realist behavior. For a more
 detailed analysis, see pp. 25-27 below.
 24. Schweller puts this well: "If states are assumed to seek nothing more than their own survival,
 why would they feel threatened? ... Anarchy and self-preservation alone are not sufficient. . ..
 Predatory states motivated by expansion and absolute gains, not security and the fear of relative
 Is Anybody Still a Realist? | 15
 the world as one of constant competition for control over scarce goods. This
 explicit assumption of fixed and uniformly conflictual preferences is the most
 general assumption consistent with the core of traditional realist theory. Gov-
 ernments may conflict over any scarce and valuable good, including agricul-
 tural land, trading rights, and allied tribute, as in the time of Thucydides;
 imperial dominion, as observed by historians from Ancient Rome through the
 Renaissance; religious identity, dynastic prerogatives, and mercantilist control,
 as in early modern Europe; national and political ideology, as in most of the
 late nineteenth and twentieth centuries; or purely economic interests, for, as
 Waltz himself observes, "economic and technological competition is often as
 keen as military competition."25
 Note that, in addition to its generality, this assumption is more permissive
 than it might appear at first glance, for three reasons. First, it does not deny
 that in world politics zero-sum conflict nearly always coexists with positive-
 sum conflicts (or tractable collective action problems). This is in fact implied
 by our proposed realist assumption that in world politics states face bargaining
 problems, because conventional bargaining theory commonly disaggregates
 negotiations into distributional and integrative elements.26 The assumption
 insists only that the explanatory power of realism is limited largely to the
 distributive aspect of such mixed-motive interstate bargaining. Explaining
 integrative aspects requires a nonrealist theory
 losses, are the prime movers of neo-realist theory. Without some possibility for their existence, the
 security dilemma melts away, as do most concepts associated with contemporary realism." Schwel-
 ler, "Neorealism's Status-Quo Bias," pp. 91, 119. Somewhat perversely for a realist, he cites
 Fukuyama, The End of History, pp. 254-255. See also Moravcsik, "Taking Preferences Seriously";
 Charles L. Glaser, "Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help," in Brown, Lynn-Jones, and
 Miller, The Perils of Anarchy; and Andrew Kydd, "Sheep in Sheep's Clothing: Why Security Seekers
 Do Not Fight Each Other," Security Studies, Vol. 7, No. 1 (Autumn 1997), pp. 153-154.
 25. Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Emerging Structure of International Politics," International Security,
 Vol. 18, No. 2 (Fall 1993), p. 57; Waltz, Theory of International Politics; Robert Gilpin, War and Change
 in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); and Michael Mastanduno, "Do
 Relative Gains Matter? America's Response to Japanese Industrial Policy," in David A. Baldwin,
 ed., Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate (New York: Columbia University Press,
 1993).
 26. Disaggregating the interactions between two may be empirically and theoretically challenging,
 but the conceptual distinction between the two dimensions of preferences remains unavoidable.
 Howard Raiffa, The Art and Science of Negotiation (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press,
 1982); James D. Morrow, "Social Choice and System Structure in World Politics," World Politics,
 Vol. 41, No. 1 (October 1988), pp. 75-97; and Stephen D. Krasner, "Global Communications and
 National Power: Life on the Pareto Frontier," in Baldwin, Neorealism and Neoliberalism, pp. 234-249.
 These theorists do not, of course, concede to a theory based on material resources the sole ability
 to explain the outcome of conflict-prevailing beliefs; asymmetrical interdependence or preference
 intensity, institutional context, and various process-level theories may also play a role.
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 Second, this assumption does not exclude most variants of so-called defen-
 sive realism-in which states are assumed to have a preference for security
 This is because the assumption of fixed, uniformly conflictual preferences need
 not mean that every set of state preferences actually are conflictual. It is consis-
 tent also with the view that-as even Mearsheimer and others commonly
 thought of as "offensive realists" contend-state preferences are on average
 conflictual. In the latter case, governments must make worst-case assumptions,
 acting "as if" preferences were fixed, uniform, and conflictual, if high uncer-
 tainty prevents governments from distinguishing true threats.27 Either way, we
 may assume for the purposes of analysis that preferences are conflictual.
 Third, we assume only that underlying preferences are fixed and conflictual,
 not that the resulting state policies and strategies or systemic outcomes (the
 dependent variables of any theory of world politics) are necessarily conflictual.
 Observed political conflict may be deterred or dissuaded by domination, brib-
 ery, threats, or balancing. For most realists, the fundamental problem of state-
 craft is to manage conflict in a world where state interests are fundamentally
 opposed. Indeed, even if underlying preference functions generate zero-sum
 conflicts among substantive ends (or are randomly distributed behind a veil
 of uncertainty), it might reasonably be assumed that all states have a fixed,
 uniform preference to minimize the political costs of bargaining itself-the
 blood and treasure squandered in warfare, sanctions, and other forms of
 coercion. Under such circumstances, we maintain, states have a strong incen-
 five to bargain efficiently and to avoid futile endeavors. This is the basis of the
 consistent realist concern, from Thucydides to Morgenthau, for moderation in
 statecraft.
 ASSUMPTION 3-INTERNATIONAL STRUCTURE: THE PRIMACY OF MATERIAL CA-
 PABILITIES. The first two assumptions-namely that states (or other hierarchi-
 cal conflict groups) are unitary, rational actors in international politics and that
 they hold conflicting preferences-imply that realism is concerned primarily
 with the determinants of distributive bargaining among states. These assump-
 tions, however, remain insufficient to distinguish realist theory, for two related
 reasons. First, they characterize only agents, but not the structure of their
 interaction. We still know nothing, even in principle, about how the outcomes
 of interstate bargaining in anarchy are determined. Second, the two assump-
 27. John J. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," in Brown, Lynn-Jones,
 and Miller, The Perils of Anarchy, p. 337; Eric Labs, "Beyond Victory: Offensive Realism and the
 Expansion of War Aims," Security Studies, Vol. 6, No. 4 (Summer 1997), pp. 1-49; and Robert Gilpin,
 "The Richness of the Tradition of Political Realism," in Keohane, Neorealism and Its Critics.
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 tions describe a world of constant background conditions. What permits us to
 explain variation in world politics?
 We thus require a third and pivotal assumption, namely that interstate
 bargaining outcomes reflect the relative cost of threats and inducements, which
 is directly proportional to the distribution of material resources. In contrast to
 theories that emphasize the role of issue-specific coordination, persuasive
 appeals to shared cultural norms or identities, relative preference intensity,
 international institutions, or collective norms in shaping bargaining outcomes,
 realism stresses the ability of states, absent a common international sovereign,
 to coerce or bribe their counterparts. This is consistent with the assumptions
 outlined above. If underlying state preferences are assumed to be zero-sum,
 there is generally no opportunity (absent a third party at whose expense both
 benefit) for mutually profitable compromise or contracting to a common insti-
 tution in order to realize positive-sum gains. Nor can states engage in mutually
 beneficial political exchange through issue linkage. The primary means of
 redistributing resources, therefore, is to threaten punishment or offer a side
 payment. It follows that the less costly threats or inducements are to the sender,
 and the more costly or valuable they are to the target, the more credible and
 effective they will be. Each state employs such means up to the point where
 making threats and promises are less costly to them than the (uniform) benefits
 thereby gained.28
 The ability of a state to do this successfully-its influence-is proportional
 to its underlying power, which is defined in terms of its access to exogenously
 varying material resources. For realists, such variation does not reduce to
 variation in preferences, beliefs, or institutional position. States faced with a
 similar strategic situation will extract a similar proportion of domestic re-
 sources. With fixed, uniform preferences, a large state will thus expend more
 resources and is therefore more likely to prevail. The obvious example is
 military force, but there is no reason to exclude from the realist domain the
 use of commercial or financial sanctions, boycotts, and inducements to achieve
 economic ends-commonly termed "mercantilism"-regardless of whether the
 outcome is connected with security or the means are military Realists need
 only assume that efficacy is proportional to total material capabilities. It follows
 that the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must.
 28. Coleman argues that coercion-"where the superordinate agrees to withhold an action that
 would make the subordinate worse off in exchange for the subordinate's obeying the superordi-
 nate"-is a "somewhat special" cas'e of exchange. Coleman, Foundations of Social Theory, p. 29; and
 Kenneth A. Oye, Economic Discrimination and Political Exchange: World Political Economy in the 1930s
 and 1980s (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1992).
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 Realists have long insisted that control over material resources in world
 politics lies at the core of realism. When Morgenthau, Waltz, and Gilpin
 proclaim that the central premise of realism is the "autonomy of the political,"
 they mean that by treating material capability as an objective, universal, and
 unalienable political instrument, independent of national preferences, institu-
 tions, and perceptions, realists isolate the essence of world politics. This simple
 notion gives force to Morgenthau's and Waltz's consistent dismissal of ideals,
 domestic institutions, economic interests, psychology, and other sources of
 varied state preferences-a position inherited (almost verbatim) from Niccolo
 Machiavelli, Friedrich Meinecke, and Max Weber.29 For all these realists, ma-
 terial resources constitute a fundamental "reality" that exercises an exogenous
 influence on state behavior no matter what states seek, believe, or construct.30
 This is the wellspring of the label "realism." Realism, we maintain, is only as
 parsimonious and distinctive as its willingness to adhere firmly to this assump-
 tion. This assertion, above all else, distinguishes realism from liberal, epistemic,
 and institutionalist explanations, which predict that domestic extraction of
 resources and interstate interaction will vary not with control over material
 resources, but with state preferences, beliefs, and information.
 The Degeneration of Contemporary Realist Theory
 So far we have argued that a distinct realist paradigm must rest on three core
 assumptions. The power of these premises can be seen in contemporary realist
 theories that adhere firmly to them. Despite his curious reluctance to make
 explicit assumptions of conflictual preferences and rationality, Kenneth Waltz's
 influential neorealist theory, which stresses the polarity of the international
 system, is broadly consistent with these premises. John Mearsheimer's gloomy
 predictions about the future of Europe, derived from consideration of the
 consequences of shifts in polarity on national military policy, are as well.31
 Joanne Gowa adheres to core realist assumptions in her provocative argument
 that both the democratic peace and post-World War II international liberaliza-
 tion were designed in large part to generate "security externalities" within a
 bipolar structure of power.32 Stephen Krasner, Robert Gilpin, and David Lake
 29. The language in Morgenthau, Politics among Nations, p. 5, is echoed almost verbatim in Waltz,
 Theory of International Politics. On Weber, see Michael Joseph Smith, Realist Thought from Weber to
 Kissinger (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1986).
 30. Frankel, "Restating the Realist Case," pp. xii-xiv.
 31. Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future."
 32. Joanne Gowa, Allies, Adversaries, and International Trade (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University
 Press, 1994).
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 have argued that the level of overall openness in the world economy is a
 function of the concentration of control over economic capabilities.33 Robert
 Keohane, while in other senses not a realist, applies a similar logic to the role
 of hegemons in international economic institutions.34 Gilpin and Paul Kennedy
 address the historical succession of security orders.35 On a recognizably realist
 basis, Dale Copeland explains major war and Christopher Layne criticizes the
 democratic peace thesis.36 Robert Powell's game-theoretical reformulation of
 realism in terms of increasing returns to material capabilities, like closely
 related theories of offense and defense dominance, fits within the three core
 assumptions, as does Barry Posen's analysis of variation in military doctrine.37
 Among those who claim to be realists today, however, adherence to these
 core realist premises is the exception rather than the rule. Most recent realist
 scholarship-notably that of "defensive" and "neoclassical" realists-flatly
 violates the second and third premises. To illustrate this tendency, we first turn
 briefly to recent developments in abstract realist theory, focusing particularly
 on explicit definitions of realism, then trace three trends in recent empirical
 theory and research that highlight the slide of realism into liberal, epistemic,
 and institutionalist theory, respectively
 MINIMAL REALISM IN THEORY
 Most recent formulations of the realist paradigm are inconsistent with our
 tripartite formulation. Most important among these, for our purposes here, is
 what we term "minimal realism." Minimal realists seek to define a distinct and
 coherent realist paradigm with reference to a set of assumptions less restrictive
 than the three we outline above.
 33. Stephen D. Krasner, "State Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade," World Politics, Vol. 28,
 No. 3 (April 1976), pp. 317-347; Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics; David A. Lake, Power,
 Protection, and Free Trade: International Sources of U.S. Commercial Policy (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell
 University Press, 1988); and Lake, "Leadership, Hegemony, and the International Economy: Naked
 Emperor or Tattered Monarch with Potential?" International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 37, No. 4
 (December 1993), pp. 459-489.
 34. Keohane, After Hegemony.
 35. Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics; and Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers
 (New York: Random House, 1987).
 36. Dale Copeland, Anticipating Power: Dynamic Realism and the Origins of Major War (Ithaca, N.Y.:
 Cornell University Press, forthcoming); and Christopher Layne, "Kant or Cant: The Myth of the
 Democratic Peace," in Brown, Lynn-Jones, and Miller, The Perils of Anarchy, pp. 287-331.
 37. Robert Powell, "Absolute and Relative Gains in International Relations Theory," American
 Political Science Review, Vol. 85, No. 4 (December 1991), pp. 701-726; and Barry R. Posen, The Sources
 of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany between the Wars (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University
 Press, 1984), pp. 69, 229.
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 The most extreme among minimal realists maintain that realism's distinct-
 iveness vis-a-vis other international relations paradigms lies solely in our first
 assumption-the existence of rational actors in an anarchic setting. Joseph
 Grieco, for example, maintains that realists need only assume rationality and
 anarchy-in other words, the pursuit of rational "self-help" strategies-to
 derive a concern about security and autonomy, a measure of underlying stra-
 tegic conflict, strategies of relative-gains seeking and balancing of material
 power, and other elements of realist theory38 Outside of a small group of such
 realists, however, a variety of scholars agree that the assumption of hierarchical
 actors interacting rationally in an anarchic world is insufficient to distinguish
 realism. As we discuss below, this assumption is shared by almost all other
 schools.39 Because anarchy and rationality are constant, moreover, assuming
 them tells us little about the distinctive realist variables and causal mechanisms
 for explaining variation in state behavior.
 Other recent definitions of a realist paradigm therefore include additional
 assumptions, which seek to serve the same functions of social theory as our
 second and third assumptions, namely to specify agency and structure, and
 the interaction between them. Two assumptions are particularly common. First,
 states seek to realize a fixed set of underlying preferences ranging from de-
 fending their territorial integrity and political independence to expanding their
 influence over their international environment (often referred to, somewhat
 misleadingly, as "security" and "power," respectively). Second, among the
 political means states employ to resolve the resulting conflicts, force and the
 threat of force are preeminent. Nearly all the authors considered in this article
 base their discussion of realism on such a definition, even when some fail to
 make this explicit.40
 38. Joseph M. Grieco, "Realist International Theory and the Study of World Politics," in Michael
 W. Doyle and G. John Ikenberry, eds., New Thinking in International Relations Theony (Boulder, Colo.:
 Westview, 1997), pp. 166-168, is most explicit.
 39. The transmethodological consensus on this point is near universal. In addition to Wendt,
 Powell, Moravcsik, Legro, and Schweller, cited above in n. 22, see Helen V. Milner, "The Assump-
 tion of Anarchy in International Relations Theory," Review of International Studies, Vol. 17, No. 1
 (January 1991), pp. 67-85.
 40. This is true also of some more unwieldy definitions. Elman and Elman, "Lakatos and Neore-
 alism," p. 923, define the realist hard core as rational, strategic states in anarchy seeking survival
 with limited resources. Ashley Tellis, "Reconstructing Political Realism: The Long March to Scien-
 tific Theory," Security Studies, Vol. 5, No. 2 (Winter 1995-1996), p. 3, describes "political actions
 aimed at enhancing security" as the "minimum realist program." Sean M. Lynn-Jones and Steven
 E. Miller, "Preface," in Brown, Lynn-Jones, and Miller, The Perils of Anarchy, pp. ix-x, focus on
 rationality, anarchy, and power, but make no assumption that underlying goals conflict and limit
 their definition to the use of military force. We see a similar move in Buzan, Jones, and Little, The
 Logic of Anarchy, which seeks to integrate interdependence, preferences, information, and institu-
 tions into a "realist" theory tied together only by the fact that it is systemic.
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 Yet even this more elaborate form of minimal realism fails to distinguish
 realism from its alternative paradigms, because nearly all variants of liberal,
 epistemic, and institutionalist theories share the same three assumptions.41
 Consider, for example, functional regime theory, democratic peace theory,
 theories of "aggressor" states, "endogenous" theories of international trade
 policy, and strategic culture theory Surely, none is realist, yet each concurs that
 in an anarchic world system, no superordinate institution can establish a
 monopoly of legitimate force; rational unitary states are the major actors.42
 (Although it is true that liberals and epistemic theorists focus on contestation
 among subnational actors in the process of preference or belief formation, they
 generally hold that they act rationally thereafter.) Nearly all agree, moreover,
 that states are self-interested and their preferences, at least in security matte rs,
 lie somewhere between security and power. Indeed, nearly all go much further,
 assuming that a perfect underlying harmony of interest is so rare as to be
 almost irrelevant; a measure of conflict over underlying values and interests,
 all modern theories agree, is endemic to world politics. Nearly all concur,
 furthermore, that governments generally place a high, perhaps superordinate,
 value on national security, territorial integrity, and political independence.
 They also agree that a central and often decisive instrument available to
 states-the ultima ratio, at least in the abstract-is coercive force. In sum, among
 modern international relations theories, the claims that "power and interests
 matter," that states seek to "influence" one another in pursuit of often conflict-
 ing "self-interests," and that "self-help" through military force is an important,
 perhaps the most important, instrument of statecraft, are trivial.
 Most clearly missing from minimal realism, as compared to the tripartite
 definition with which we began, are any distinctive assumptions about the
 source and resolution of conflict. Yet its adherents continue to employ realist
 rhetoric and claim consistency with traditional realist theory This lack of
 41. Some sociological theories take the somewhat different view that actors behave according to
 a noninstrumental "logic of appropriateness," whereby actors conform to internalized rules im-
 posed by society. See Martha Finnemore, National Interests in International Society (Ithaca, N.Y.:
 Cornell University Press, 1996), pp. 28-31; and James March and Johan Olsen, Rediscovering Insti-
 tutions: The Organizational Basis of Politics (New York: Free Press, 1989).
 42. Stefano Guzzini's assessment goes to the heart of the matter: "The closest we can get to ... a
 single . . . assumption that would demarcate realism is the idea of anarchy . .. [But] traditional
 defenders of collective security [as well as 'democratic peace' liberals] have the same starting point.
 Rather than setting Realism apart from other international theories, the assumption of anarchy sets
 International Relations apart from other disciplines." Guzzini, Realism in International Relations and
 International Political Economy: The Continuing Stony of a Death Foretold (New York: Routledge, 1998),
 pp. viii-ix. See also Helen V. Milner, "The Assumption of Anarchy in International Relations"; and
 Keohane, "Introduction," After Hegemony.
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 distinctiveness is not simply a matter of abstract definition. It is, we argue, the
 most striking common characteristic of contemporary midrange "realist" theo-
 ries. Increasingly, realist research invokes factors extraneous, even contradic-
 tory, to the three core realist assumptions, but consistent with core assumptions
 of existing nonrealist paradigms. This degeneration takes three distinct forms,
 depending on whether realists invoke exogenous variation in preferences,
 beliefs, or international institutions. These correspond, respectively, to realist
 degeneration into liberal, epistemic, and institutionalist theories. Below we
 consider each in turn.
 FROM REALISM TO LIBERALISM: POWER IS WHAT STATES WANT IT TO BE
 The traditional realist view-about which there was, until recently, little dis-
 agreement-assumes that state preferences are fixed and uniform. Morgenthau
 and Waltz, we have seen, believed that this assumption accounts for realism's
 power and parsimony.43 Still, there has been heated debate among modern
 realists over precisely which fixed, uniform preferences should be ascribed to
 states. Morgenthau emphasizes power itself as a goal, by which he may have
 meant a generalized desire to expand.44 Waltz speaks of survival as the ulti-
 mate goal of states, but allows that states may seek anything between minimal
 survival and world domination. As we have seen, this assumption imposes
 almost no constraint on state behavior, because it subsumes the entire spectrum
 of possible motivations of states from pure harmony to zero-sum conflict,
 unidefined and untheorized. Only outright self-abnegation is excluded.45 This
 has given rise to a variety of formulations of the precise specification of state
 preferences. For our purposes, we need note only that throughout there has
 been agreement in principle that realism must assume fixed and uniform pref-
 erences, without which it loses its distinctiveness and power.
 Yet many intellectual descendents of Morgenthau and Waltz reject even this.
 They neither simply disagree about the specific nature of fixed assumptions to
 43. Morgenthau speaks for nearly all realists in arguing that realism must "guard against two
 popular fallacies: the concern with motives and the concern with ideological preferences.
 History shows no exact and necessary correlation between the quality of motives and the quality
 of foreign policy." Morgenthau, Politics among Nations, pp. 5-7; Waltz, Theory of International Politics,
 p. 29, see also pp. 65-66, 79, 90, 108-112, 196-198, 271; and Grieco, "Realist International Theory,"
 p. 165.
 44. Morgenthau's use of the term "power" can be ill-defined and overly expansive. See Inis L.
 Claude, Power and International Relations (New York: Random House, 1962), pp. 25-37.
 45. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, pp. 118, 126. Fareed Zakaria speaks for most contemporary
 realists when he terms Waltz's writings on such questions "confused and contradictory." Zakaria,
 From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America's World Role (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
 University Press, 1998), pp. 26-28.
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 be assumed, nor even challenge the notion that they are conflictual. They reject
 the underlying notion of fixed preferences itself. Nearly all argue that state
 behavior is influenced not just by power calculations, but by the varying points
 on the spectrum between motivations of security and power (expansion) on
 which different states find themselves. Such explanations inevitably import
 consideration of exogenous variation in the societal and cultural sources of
 state preferences, thereby sacrificing both the coherence of realism and appro-
 priating midrange theories of interstate conflict based on liberal assumptions.
 Such theories include those that stress the nature of domestic representative
 institutions (e.g., the democratic peace), the nature of economic interests (e.g.,
 liberal interdependence theories), and collective values concerning national
 identity, socioeconomic redistribution, and political institutions.
 Our skeptical judgment is hardly new. A generation ago, Arnold Wolfers
 drew the consequences of such ad hoc extensions of realist theory: "One
 consequence of distinctions such as these [between hostile and status quo
 states] is worth mentioning. They rob [realist] theory of the determinate and
 predictive character that seemed to give the pure power hypothesis its peculiar
 value. It can no longer be said of the actual world, for example, that a power
 vacuum cannot exist for any length of time."46 This tendency is evident in the
 work of self-styled realists like Jack Snyder, Joseph Grieco, Fareed Zakaria,
 Randall Schweller, and Stephen Van Evera.
 JACK SNYDER ON IMPERIALISM. We begin with Jack Snyder's analysis of im-
 perialism, to which we owe the label "defensive realism." Snyder sets out to
 explain "overexpansion"-situations in which great powers expand beyond
 the point where they trigger overwhelming countercoalitions and disastrous
 counterpressures. Unlike some of the theorists we examine below, Snyder
 provides a detailed theory to back his claims about the importance of domestic
 politics. For Snyder, the taproot of overexpansion lies in the misrepresentation
 of domestic interests such that small rent-seeking groups can profit at the
 expense of diffuse constituencies-a general tendency exacerbated by deliber-
 ate manipulation of ideology and logrolling among "cartelized" interest
 groups. The extent to which states are prone to such pathologies is a function,
 Snyder argues, of the timing of industrialization.47
 46. Arnold Wolfers, "The Pole of Power and the Pole of Indifference," in Wolfers, ed., Discord and
 Collaboration: Essays in International Politics (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962),
 p. 42, see also pp. 86, 156, 160. Even in Waltz, Theory of International Politics, we encounter only
 the assertion, rather than the derivation, of the primacy of systemic concerns.
 47. Jack Snyder, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell
 University Press, 1991).
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 Snyder presents this argument as an improvement of realism by integrating
 domestic factors consistent with it. "My arguments stressing the domestic
 determinants of grand strategy," he argues, "are fully consistent with the
 defensive version of realism"-an ascription he defends with reference to
 Morgenthau.48 Yet while many treat Snyder's argument as a definitive state-
 ment of defensive realism, his position has been criticized for its heavy reliance
 on domestic factors. As Zakaria observes: "While neorealism is loosely de-
 picted as leaving domestic politics out, many defensive realists in fact have
 displayed the opposite tendency, using domestic politics to do all the work in
 their theories. . . . In the end we are left not with a novel combination of
 systemic and domestic determinants, but with a restatement of the traditional
 Innenpolitik case."49 At the very least, Snyder's effort to redefine realism as
 including assumptions and causal mechanisms not traditionally connected
 with it has led realists into conceptual confusion about whether realism means
 anything at all. To employ more traditional terminology, if, as Zakaria asserts,
 realism subsumes both what Waltz terms "structural factors" at the system
 level and classic diplomatic historians the Primat der Aussenpolitik, and domes-
 tic and societal factors that alter state preferences, which diplomatic historians
 term the Primat der Innenpolitik, what is excluded? Are any concrete assump-
 tions of this theory still distinctly realist?
 Yet the problem is even more fundamental. What is innovative in Snyder's
 explanation draws almost exclusively on an existing nonrealist international
 relations paradigm. Snyder's is a classically liberal analysis of the impact on
 foreign policy of shifting domestic state-society relations in modernizing socie-
 ties. As a matter of intellectual history, Snyder's theory is drawn from John
 Hobson and, as Zakaria notes, the left-liberal and social democratic German
 Innenpolitik school. As a matter of social science theory, its core assumptions
 are almost identical to contemporary theories of the democratic peace and of
 the role of domestic institutions in trade policy, both of which rest on specific
 implications of domestic misrepresentation and rent seeking for foreign policy.
 In sum, there is a disjuncture between label and reality Snyder's midrange
 theory does not confirm realist assumptions; it demonstrates the power and
 generality of fundamental liberal assumptions beyond the simple case of the
 democratic peace. His theoretical language, which terms all of this "realist,"
 48. Ibid., p. 12, see also pp. 19-20, 64.
 49. Fareed Zakaria, "Realism and Domestic Politics: A Review Essay," in Brown, Lynn-Jones, and
 Miller, The Perils of Anarchy, quote on p. 463, and Zakaria, From Wealth to Power, pp. 32-33, 181-183.
 We do not endorse all of Zakaria's criticisms of Snyder.
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 simply obscures, if not misstates outright, the significance of his important
 empirical result.
 JOSEPH GRIECO ON RELATIVE GAINS. Joseph Grieco's proposal to define real-
 ism in terms of states' concerns about relative gains provides another example,
 this one from political economy, of how the line between power and prefer-
 ences can become blurred when realism is not rigorously defined. Grieco posits
 that states are "defensive positionalists" in search of security-a desire that
 makes them sensitive to relative rather than absolute gains. States cooperate
 less-or, more precisely, they cooperate under different circumstances-than
 the mere presence of mutual benefits might lead us to expect, because they
 must "pay close attention to how cooperation might affect relative capabilities
 in the future."50 Despite much criticism of this formulation and disagreement
 about whether the gains in question are actually "relative," Grieco clearly
 captures an essential quality of realism, namely its assumption of underlying
 conflict-a quality we highlight in our statement of core assumptions.51
 Grieco is aware that states do not always forgo "absolute" economic benefits
 for "relative" geopolitical gains, so that any theory must state the antecedent
 conditions under which relative-gains seeking occurs. Given that not all states
 in all situations are equally sensitive to gaps in payoffs, he argues, we should
 employ a factor (termed k) that measures sensitivity to gaps between payoffs
 (relative gains), alongside absolute gains. We can thus restate Grieco's causal
 claim as follows: When k is high, states are more motivated to seek relative
 gains (or limit losses). This simply displaces the causal question, however,
 for we are now impelled to ask: What determines the value of k? What
 motivates states to worry about relative gains? Is this motivation distinctively
 realist?
 In answering these questions, Grieco is driven to tinker with the assumption
 of fixed preferences, thus revealing that his relative gains-seeking definition
 of realism lacks theoretical coherence and distinctiveness. How does Grieco
 seek to establish the "realist" nature of his argument? He does so by assuming
 that the issue area in question explains variation in k. Specifically, k is always
 high in security affairs, an assumption endorsed by Mearsheimer and others.52
 Yet this assumed correlation between security policy and relative-gains seeking
 (even if it were clearly realist) is unsustainable. On the one hand, there are
 50. Joseph M. Grieco, "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest
 Liberal Institutionalism," in Baldwin, Neorealisnz and Neoliberalism, p. 138; and Powell, "Absolute
 and Relative Gains in International Relations Theory."
 51. For the subsequent debate, see Baldwin, Neorealism and Neoliberalism.
 52. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," p. 342.
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 numerous security issues-say, interactions among democracies, the construc-
 tion of security regimes, or power politics without increasing returns-about
 which it is difficult to conclude that there is any incentive to pursue a relative
 gains-seeking strategy.53 Even more striking, economic conflict alone can give
 rise to realist and mercantilist dynamics, without the involvement of any
 security interest-as scholars such as Stephen Krasner, Michael Mastanduno,
 James Fearon, and David Lake have demonstrated.54 As many critics have
 noted, neither Grieco's analysis of post-Tokyo round trade policy nor his other
 work reveals convincing evidence that "relative gains" in those areas could be
 exploited to threaten national security.55
 Cut loose from the claim that all security conflicts necessarily generate
 intense underlying conflict (a high value of k), however, the "relative-gains
 seeking" account of realism no longer imposes any a priori theoretical con-
 straint on variation in state preferences (variation in k). The argument becomes
 instead: When state interests clash, for whatever reason, conflict is more likely.
 Yet because other theories-realist, liberal, epistemic, and institutionalist-also
 predict that conflict may result from opposed interests and offer explanations
 of that variation in interests, there is nothing distinctly realist about relative-
 gains seeking per se.56 In seeking to specify the determinants of variation in k,
 Grieco himself invokes variation in the nature of individual states-including
 "previous experiences," "reputation for exploitation," and whether they are
 "long-term ally . .. or adversary"-as well as more traditionally realist factors
 connected with relative power.57 Indeed, nonrealist studies of trade policy find
 53. Bruce M. Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World (Princeton,
 N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993); Robert Jervis, "Security Regimes," International Organization,
 Vol. 36, No. 2 (Spring 1982), pp. 357-378; Jack Snyder, "Averting Anarchy in the New Europe,"
 International Security, Vol. 14, No. 4 (Spring 1990), pp. 5-41; and George Downs and Keisuke lida,
 "Assessing the Theoretical Case against Collective Security," in Downs, ed., Collective Security
 beyond the Cold War (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994), pp. 17-39.
 54. Krasner, Structural Conflict; Mastanduno, "Do Relative Gains Matter?"; James D. Fearon, "Ra-
 tionalist Explanations for War," International Organization, Vol. 49, No. 3 (Summer 1995), pp. 379-
 414; and Lake, "Leadership, Hegemony, and the International Economy"
 55. Peter Liberman, "Trading with the Enemy: Security and Relative Economic Gains," International
 Security, Vol. 21, No. 1 (Summer 1996), pp. 155-158; Moravcsik, "Taking Preferences Seriously,"
 pp. 538-540; and Robert 0. Keohane, "Institutionalist Theory and the Realist Challenge after the
 Cold War," in Baldwin, Neorealism and Neoliberalism, p. 280ff.
 56. Because k cannot be observed directly and it is difficult to differentiate security from power
 seeking-hence the security dilemma-it is difficult to know how this theory could be tested,
 absent a theory of the determinants of k. There has been, to our knowledge, no attempt to measure
 k independently of state behavior. Cf. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institu-
 tions," pp. 347-348.
 57. See Joseph M. Grieco, "Realist Theory and the Problem of International Cooperation," Journal
 of Politics, Vol. 50, No. 3 (August 1988), pp. 610-612; and Grieco, Cooperation among Nations: Europe,
 America, and Non-Tariff Barriers to Trade (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1990), pp. 45-47.
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 that particularly strong pressure from economic interest groups-the classic
 liberal explanation for protection-is concentrated in precisely those areas
 (government procurement and industrial standardization) in which Grieco's
 study of the Tokyo round finds unexplained relative-gains seeking.58
 Absent a tighter paradigmatic definition of realism and more detailed spe-
 cification of its causal mechanisms, this fundamental indeterminacy and lack
 of theoretical distinctiveness cannot be surmounted. The central problem for
 Grieco is quite simply that relative-gains concerns, conflict, inefficient bargain-
 ing, and suboptimal cooperation are predicted by all major rationalist (and
 some nonrationalist) theories of international relations. The key differences
 among paradigms lie not in whether they predict interstate conflict-all do-but
 in when, why, and under what circumstances they predict conflict. Bargaininig
 failures, such as those Grieco observes in the General Agreement on Tariffs and
 Trade, may result from inefficient bargaining under uncertainty, as institution-
 alists and negotiation analysts maintain; from particularly conflictual societal
 preferences, as liberals argue; or from a lack of shared language or cultural
 capital, as some epistemic theorists assert-as well as concerns about future
 power, as realists contend. Without a more precise specification of realism,
 Grieco cannot distinguish these empirically or theoretically.59
 NEOCLASSICAL REALISM. Whereas Snyder and Grieco stress the preference of
 states for security, a new generation of realists, recently heralded by Gideon
 Rose as "neoclassical realists" (NCRs), stresses the other pole of Waltz's loose
 specification of state preferences-the natural desire of all states to wield
 external influence.60 States, the NCRs argue, do not simply respond defensively
 to threats; they exploit power differentials to expand their influence over their
 external environment-a view of international politics quite different from that
 based on the simple assumption that states seek security. Some of these real-
 ists-notably Zakaria, as we have seen-are harsh critics of Snyder and others
 for their purported ad hoc reliance on domestic factors to explain conflict
 among states assumed only to seek security.
 58. For a review of this literature, James E. Alt, Jeffry Frieden, Michael J. Gilligan, Dani Rodrik,
 and Ronald Rogowski, "The Political Economy of International Trade: Enduring Puzzles and an
 Agenda for Inquiry," Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 29, No. 6 (December 1996), pp. 689-717.
 59. Krasner, "Global Communications and National Power"; and Keohane, "Institutionalist Theory
 and the Realist Challenge." If such bargaining failure cannot be attributed to concerns about ex
 post cheating, Grieco argues, it confirms realist claims. Yet Grieco concedes the existence of a
 competing liberal explanation in a long footnote, but then drops the point. Grieco, "Anarchy and
 the Limits of Cooperation," pp. 486-488.
 60. Gideon Rose, "Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy," World Politics, Vol. 51, No.
 1 (October 1998), pp. 144-172.
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 Yet, ironically, neoclassical realism (NCR) suffers from precisely the same
 weaknesses as defensive realism, namely theoretical indeterminacy and a reli-
 ance on exogenous variation in state preferences. Most NCRs seek to incorpo-
 rate in one form or another variation between states with underlying status
 quo and revisionist preferences. The incorporation of variation in underlying
 domestic preferences, we argue, undermines (if not eliminates) the theoretical
 distinctiveness of NCR as a form of realism by rendering it indistinguishable
 from nonrealist theories about domestic institutions, ideas, and interests. For
 realists, however, these domestic preference shifts, moreover, remain ad hoc.61
 As with defensive realists, this inclination toward indeterminacy and in-
 distinctness is not a purely abstract concern, but adversely influences the
 empirical work of some of realism's latest and brightest defenders. Consider
 the work of Zakaria and Schweller.
 FAREED ZAKARIA ON NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA. Fareed Zakaria offers
 an insightful analysis of the reasons why the U.S. government moved toward
 expansion in the late nineteenth century more slowly and less thoroughly than
 shifts in relative power predict. To explain this neorealist anomaly, Zakaria
 rejects the traditional realist assumption of a unitary state in favor of a distinc-
 tion between domestic state apparatus (state) and society (nation). State power,
 he argues, depends not just on control over resources, but on the ability of
 states to extract those resources from society.62 The tendency of states to expand
 is thus a function of the international and domestic power of the state. Both,
 he contends, were necessary for late-nineteenth-century U.S. expansion. Inso-
 far as states are influenced by relative power and can muster societal support
 for their policies, they exploit opportunities to wield influence.
 Zakaria's argument is a noteworthy effort to bridge the gap between domes-
 tic and international politics. Yet it rests decisively on treating a state's ability
 to extract societal resources not simply as an exogenous factor predictably
 related to geographical control over material resources, but also as a function
 of particular domestic political circumstances. Zakaria compounds the inherent
 indeterminacy of an unweighted combination of material and domestic politi-
 cal sources of power by offering no general theory (or even consistent inter-
 61. Ibid. Rose seeks to make a virtue of this, citing Aristotle for the proposition that domestic
 politics is simply too complex a subject about which to generalize. This claim must come as a
 surprise not only to scholars of comparative and U.S. politics, but to those who study the
 democratic peace, economic interdependence, aggressive ideologies, and other domestic determi-
 nants of security policy In any case, no more recent support for the assumption is provided.
 62. For a similar argument, see Thomas J. Christensen, Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic
 Mobilization, and Sino-Amnerican Conflict, 1947-1958 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press,
 1996).
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 pretation) of shifts in domestic state power. Absent a theory of domestic
 politics, any argument about why a particular state can extract more or fewer
 resources from domestic society (even an argument implying irrational state
 behavior) becomes consistent with what Zakaria terms "state-centered real-
 ism." This is reflected in the exceptionally wide range of considerations that
 he admits affected "the degree to which national power can be converted into
 state power"-including technological, ideological, institutional, partisan, cul-
 tural, and racial influences.63
 Although Zakaria employs an indeterminate assemblage of causal factors,
 he draws disproportionately on precisely those liberal factors cited by contem-
 porary liberal democratic peace or endogenous tariff theorists-as well as early
 twentieth-century "idealists." (This is particularly ironic, given his widely cited
 criticism of Snyder for adhering to just this Primat der Innenpolitik.) Zakaria
 returns repeatedly to a core claim of democratic peace theory, namely that
 legislative or judicial control over the executive undermines its ability to
 deploy force aggressively, except where expected costs are low.64 He frequently
 invokes mutual recognition among liberal republics, economic modernization,
 public unwillingness to increase taxes for overseas adventures or military
 procurement, popular opinion on questions like race, and partisan politics-all
 well-developed liberal causal mechanisms. Surely Morgenthau, Carr, and
 George Kennan would be hard pressed to recognize in such a view a renewal
 of classical realism.65
 RANDALL SCHWELLER ON INTERWAR FOREIGN POLICY. Randall Schweller's
 book on the security policy of the great powers between the world wars, Deadly
 Imbalances, offers another instructive example of how recent realists have come
 to rely on ad hoc variation in state preferences in lieu of variation in (even
 broad measures of) capabilities.66 Schweller argues that the decisive cause of
 changes in state behavior during the 1930s was a perceived shift in the power
 structure from multipolarity to tripolarity. This appears at first glance to be a
 traditional realist argument, yet the shift in polarity in the 1930s was not, in
 63. Zakaria, From Wealth to Power, p. 38.
 64. Ibid., pp. 60-67, 77-78, 90-127.
 65. Zakaria cites Otto Hintze and Morgenthau in his defense. Yet Hintze viewed state structure
 as a product of international circumstances, not the reverse. Morgenthau, we shall see, did not
 believe that his claims about moral restraint were realist. Vague though Morgenthau's notion of
 "power" may be, he firmly rejects appeals to public opinion. "The government," he wrote, "must
 realize that it is the leader and not the slave of public opinion. [Public opinion is] continuously
 created and recreated by informed and responsible leadership." Morgenthau, Politics among Na-
 tions, pp. 133-135, 205, chap. 9.
 66. Randall L. Schweller, Deadly Imbalances: Tripolarity and Hitler's Strategy of World Conquest (New
 York: Columbia University Press, 1998).
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 Schweller's view, the result of exogenous shifts in the distribution of material
 resources. Instead it reflected the decisions of particular revisionist nations,
 notably Germany, to build up their military forces beyond what was tolerated
 by others or required for security. Germany's leap from a lesser power to major
 power "pole," for example, occurs suddenly as a result of Adolf Hitler's rise
 to power in 1933 and his particular idiosyncratic conception of German na-
 tional interest.67
 This shift in emphasis from variation in material capabilities to variation in
 state preferences is the essence of Schweller's theoretical contribution. Schwel-
 ler criticizes Stephen Walt for his unwillingness to integrate fully variation in
 state preferences. He proposes Walt's evolution from "balance of power" to
 "balance of threat" be extended one step further to "balance-of-interest" theory.
 State behavior and international outcomes, he argues, vary with the distribu-
 tion of both state power and state preferences, but primarily the latter. "The
 most important determinant of alignment decisions," Schweller asserts, "is the
 compatibility of political goals, not imbalances of power or threat."68 One
 simply cannot assume that states uniformly seek any particular goal. Some
 states ("wolves" and "jackals," he terms them) have an intrinsic desire for
 revision or risky gain, while other states ("lambs" and "lions") seek only the
 status quo. Schweller's predictions are driven by this distinction. Revisionists,
 he argues, "bandwagon for profit" and thus seek "minimum winning coali-
 tions," while status quo states seek to balance only against threats and are
 comfortable with overwhelming power. Many other similar predictions fol-
 low.69
 With this analysis, Schweller reverses the causal arrow of realism. Rather
 than arguing, as have realists for centuries, that the distribution of power
 influences state behavior despite varying preferences, he offers a compelling
 and creative account of how governments adjust their power to their prefer-
 ences. Coherence and distinctiveness are thereby sacrificed. The coherence of
 realism is undermined because it is unclear what set of common nontrivial
 assumptions would permit us to explain state behavior as a function of both
 variation in power and variation in underlying state preferences. Schweller,
 67. Ibid., pp. 26-29, 93-120.
 68. Ibid., p. 22; and Randall L. Schweller, "Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State
 Back In," in Brown, Lynn-Jones, and Miller, The Perils of Anarchy, pp. 255-257. Andrew Kydd terms
 this view "motivational realism." Kydd, "Sheep in Sheep's Clothing." This, it should be noted,
 violates Rose's explicit definition of NCR, which assumes that systemic factors remain empirically
 more important.
 69. See Schweller, Deadly Imbalances, pp. 84-89; and Schweller, "New Realist Research on Alli-
 ances," pp. 928-929.
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 moreover, neither consistently invokes nor develops any particular theory of
 domestic preferences-let alone a distinctively realist one.70 To the contrary,
 insofar as we can read a theory into Schweller's empirical interpretations, he
 tends, like Zakaria, to invoke concrete causal mechanisms central to liberal and
 epistemic theories. In the few cases in which he speculates on the underlying
 sources of state preferences, Schweller cites the democratic peace and the
 aggressiveness of totalitarian dictators.71 What is excluded from such an analy-
 sis? And if preexisting liberal international relations theories offer more de-
 tailed, compelling, and empirically robust causal mechanisms, what is gained
 by subsuming a thinner version under a loose conception of "realism"?72
 To defend the realist label, Schweller neither links his argument to a coherent
 set of realist assumptions nor explicitly distinguishes it from nonrealist theoiy.
 Instead, he invokes intellectual history.73 Morgenthau, he maintains, employed
 the distinction between status quo and revisionist states, as well as writing
 about the role of domestic politics, ideas, and institutions. Schweller's appeal
 to the intellectual history of classical realism deserves our closer attention,
 because it-and the characteristic error in social science theorizing it repre-
 sents-is also found in the scholarship of Zakaria, Snyder, and others.
 Efforts to define realism by reference to intellectual history in general, and
 classical realism in particular, are deeply flawed. The coherence of theories is
 not defined by their intellectual history, but by their underlying assumptions
 and causal mechanisms. Resort to intellectual history offers a circular defini-
 tion, restating rather than resolving the question of what realism is: It is what
 realists believe, and realists are those who believe it. Moreover, intellectual
 traditions, and even individual statements, contain unresolved, often contra-
 dictory tensions. Thus scholars have long debated whether the arguments of
 realists from Thucydides to Kennan are in fact coherently realist.74 It is note-
 worthy-although thoroughly unnoted in current debates-that Carr and Mor-
 genthau themselves denied that any argument they advanced was ipso facto
 realist. Both were generally careful to distinguish the realist parts of their
 70. See Schweller, Deadly Imbalances, pp. 31-38.
 71. See, for example, ibid., pp. 200-201.
 72. This confusing situation can arise because Schweller, like other contemporary realists, tests his
 theory against neorealism but ignores nonrealist alternatives.
 73. Ibid., p. 20.
 74. Those with concerns other than social scientific explanation may legitimately see indetermi-
 nacy and richness as a virtue. Michael W. Doyle concludes a recent study of realism by warning
 that if we "want to retain the range,of insight embodied in the works of Thucydides, Machiavelli,
 Hobbes, and Rousseau ... we need to reject a monolithic conception of a Realist model." Doyle,
 Ways of War and Peace: Realism, Liberalism, and Socialism (New York: W.W. Norton, 1997), p. 195; see
 also pp. 137-160.
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 analysis from nonrealist parts-often by chapter or section.75 For all these
 reasons, rigorous assumptions, not received authority, should determine the
 coherence of social scientific theory.
 On the specific issue of status quo states, moreover, Schweller (like Snyder
 and Zakaria) simply misreads Morgenthau. In this regard a true realist, Mor-
 genthau introduces "status quo" and "revisionist" policies (he terms them "the
 policy of imperialism" and "the policy of the status quo," and adds also the
 "policy of prestige") as strategies, not preferences. That is to say, he seeks to
 show that policies that appear to be the result of varying ideologies and
 intentions are in fact tactics in a common "struggle for power." In the three
 chapters devoted to these policies in Politics among Nations, such policies are
 explained as responses to shifts in relative power owing to factors such as "lost
 wars" and "weakness."76 For Schweller and other contemporary realists, by
 contrast, the status quo/revisionist distinction refers to exogenous variation in
 state preferences, independent of power, which in turn reflects varied domestic
 circumstances and state-society relations. This is precisely the sort of theoretical
 appeal that Morgenthau, in this sense a true realist, rejects explicitly. Wolfers
 again summarizes the matter succinctly: "[In the claim that] countries that seek
 self-extension tend to be the initiators of power competition and the resort to
 violence . .. lies the significant kernel of truth in the idealist theory of aggres-
 sion."77 Schweller has transformed realism into idealism.
 STEPHEN VAN EVERA ON THE CAUSES OF WAR. A final example of the slide
 from power to preferences is visible in the work of Stephen Van Evera-argu-
 ably the most influential scholar among a generation that has revitalized
 theoretical debates in security studies. Van Evera's magisterial study of the
 causes of war aims explicitly to improve realism by highlighting the weak-
 nesses of objective material measures of aggregate power and redirecting us
 to consider a broader range of factors.78
 75. For example, Morgenthau distinguishes consistently and explicitly between realist and nonre-
 alist elements. The realist elements rest on "the concept of interest defined in terms of power,"
 which "sets politics as [a] . . . sphere of action and understanding" independent of law, morality,
 or economics. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations, pp. 5, 7-8, 12. He explicitly sets off sections on
 norms and institutions with an introduction presenting them as alternatives to the initial realist
 theory. Ibid., p. 227. E.H. Carr's classic realist statement contains similarly self-conscious dichoto-
 mies. Carr, The Twenty-Years' Crisis, 1919-1939 (New York: Harper and Row, 1964), pp. 93-94.
 76. See especially Morgenthau, Politics among Nations, pp. 50-51. About this there is no exegetical
 ambiguity in the relevant chapters. Still, we agree with Robert Keohane that there is considerable
 contradiction and paradigmatic ambiguity in these theorists.
 77. Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration, p. 96.
 78. Stephen Van Evera, Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Conflict (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell Univer-
 sity Press, 1999); citations are from a manuscript copy.
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 Although Van Evera does employ some progressive extensions of the realist
 research program, notably hypotheses on the consequences of variation in the
 offense-defense balance, his major focus is on preferences and perceptions, not
 objective measures, of power.79 He is admirably clear, moreover, in explicitly
 rejecting both a Waltzian interpretation of biased preferences (which treats
 them as an indirect consequence of underlying power structures) and a ran-
 dom, psychological, or irrational explanation of them. Instead Van Evera, very
 much like Snyder in his work on imperialism, attributes biased perceptions of
 power to the generalizable impact of four factors: manipulation by elites,
 self-serving bureaucracies, militarism, and nationalist ideology Where these
 factors are present, aggression and war are more likely As in Snyder's work,
 the preferences and relative power of social groups are the underlying,inde-
 pendent variables, while perceptions and ideas often serve as an intervening
 process that widens and deepens the domestic influence of those groups.80
 An obvious objection to such a broad definition of realism is simply that it
 lacks any analytical coherence. What common assumptions can it claim with
 realism?
 The problem here, however, is not simply the breadth and questionable
 coherence of Van Evera's brand of realism. A deeper flaw is that the concrete
 causal mechanisms Van Evera cites-his willingness to make these very explicit
 is among the most admirable qualities of his work-stems from existing non-
 realist international relations paradigms. Most relate state behavior to inequali-
 ties and biases in the preferences and power of particularistic domestic interest
 groups, who mislead or coerce the less powerful to pursue policies to their
 narrow advantage. Such arguments lie at the very core of the liberal interna-
 tional relations paradigm, in which domestic misrepresentation is an important
 source of interstate conflict in issues ranging from war to tariff policy
 What could be more classically liberal, for example, than Van Evera's well-
 reasoned conjecture that misperceptions '"originate with the world's propagan-
 dists, spin doctors, and professional obfuscators, whose self-serving falsehoods
 become national misperceptions" and that "publics misperceive because they
 are misled by national leaders, state bureaucracies, or propagandists"'?81 In his
 influential article, "Primed for Peace," Van Evera explains post-Cold War peace
 79. Ibid., p. 8.
 80. Ibid., pp. 9-10. Van Evera is quite explicit that he considers this move realist: "The theories
 discussed here address the effects of the structure of power, or of perceptions of the structure of
 power. As such they fall into the Realist camp. Their explanatory power therefore adds to the
 overall explanatory power of Realism, and bolsters Realist arguments that power factors strongly
 shape international politics."
 81. Ibid.
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 in Western Europe with reference to a bold series of classical liberal generali-
 zations: economically modern, politically democratic, nationalistically satisfied
 governments with civilian control over the military, liberal education, complex
 technological networks, and generous social welfare systems do not provoke
 wars.82 Although more modern and sophisticated, Van Evera's core thesis is
 an intellectual descendent of arguments advanced by early twentieth-century
 liberal "idealists" like Normal Angell, John Hobson, Lionel Robbins, and
 Leonard Wolff. Properly understood in terms of its general assumptions and
 causal processes, Van Evera's scholarship is a confirmation of the unexpectedly
 robust predictive power of the assumptions underlying liberal or epistemic
 paradigms-even in the area of pure security studies.83 The dilution of recent
 realism obscures this essential commonality
 Whereas the modern liberal international relations paradigm explicitly links
 domestic misrepresentation to general causal mechanisms and core assump-
 tions underlying phenomena from the democratic peace to tariff policy, Van
 Evera's hypotheses-despite the brilliance with which they are elaborated-
 remain theoretically ad hoc. They are related to no explicit set of paradigmatic
 assumptions-though we have seen their true provenance. Little is gained and
 much lost by disconnecting such arguments from the liberal assumptions that
 underlie them and presenting them instead as realist. Van Evera is doing more
 here than simply challenging a narrow neorealist formulation of realism. In all
 but name, Van Evera, like Snyder, Grieco, Zakaria, and Schweller, has trans-
 formed realism into its opposite.
 FROM REALISM TO EPISTEMIC THEORY: POWER IS WHAT STATES BELIEVE IT TO BE
 Realism's central analytical leverage, parsimony, and distinctiveness derive
 from its ability to explain social life simply through variation in the distribution
 of objective material power capabilities, rather than preferences, perceptions,
 or norms. As Benjamin Frankel succinctly puts it, realism assumes "that there
 are things out there that exist independently of our thoughts and experience.
 When we admonish an individual to be realistic we urge that individual to
 give up beliefs or notions that fly in the face of reality"84 Yet while contempo-
 rary realists continue to speak of international "power," their midrange expla-
 82. Stephen Van Evera, "Causes of War, Volume 2, Misperception and Its Roots," unpublished
 book manuscript, pp. 9-10.
 83. For a study demonstrating why it is necessary to treat Van Evera as something other than a
 realist in order to engage in any sort of orderly empirical testing, see Peter Liberman, "The Spoils
 of Conquest," International Security, Vol. 18, No. 2 (Fall 1993), pp. 125-153.
 84. Frankel, "Restating the Realist Case," p. xiii.
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 nations of state behavior have subtly shifted the core emphasis from variation
 in objective power to variation in beliefs and perceptions of power.
 This poses a fundamental problem. If the perceptions and beliefs about
 effective means-ends calculations of states, given adequate information, con-
 sistently fail to correspond to material power relationships, then power is at
 best one of a number of important factors and perhaps a secondary one. The
 parsimony and coherence of realist theory is eroded.85 When recent realists
 theorize this relationship explicitly, moreover, they are forced to borrow propo-
 sitions more fully elaborated in existing epistemic theories, which theorize the
 influence of societal beliefs that structure means-ends calculations and affect
 perceptions of the environment. If realism subsumes, alongside traditional
 material capabilities, factors such as national ideology, organizational biases,
 and perceptions, what remains theoretically distinctive? If any government
 acting on the basis of geopolitical national interest or the aims of a particularis-
 tic interest group or ideationally induced strategies or misperceptions is in
 accord with "realist" theory, what plausible constraints on state behavior are
 excluded?
 We have already glimpsed this tendency in the work discussed in the
 preceding section. As well as relying on exogenous variation in preferences,
 these works accord causal significance to exogenous shifts in collective beliefs
 about means-ends relations. Snyder and Van Evera dip into epistemic theory
 when they highlight "blowback," whereby elites and states become trapped in
 their own myths. The resulting policies no longer serve either elite interests,
 as liberals predict, or the maintenance of the balance of power, as realists
 predict.86 Van Evera points in particular to the cultural factors, independent
 from actual technology and military feasibility, that shape how states view the
 offense-defense balance.87 Schweller invokes epistemes when he asserts that
 85. Robert Jervis, "Realism, Game Theory, and Cooperation," World Politics, Vol. 40, No. 3 (April
 1988), pp. 317-349. It is, of course, consistent with realism to trace the nature of perception and
 calculation back to the distribution of material power, as does Waltz in Theory of International
 Politics, pp. 168-172.
 86. Snyder, Myths of Empire, pp. 41-42, 49. Van Evera recognizes the problem and resolves it by
 assertion: "The Realist family includes causes lying in the structure of international power and in
 the misperceptions of that structure, although rather limited room is allowed for misperceptions."
 Van Evera, Causes of War, p. 9 n. 12.
 87. Van Evera, Causes of War, chap. 6. Building on Van Evera's earlier work, Christensen and
 Snyder emphasize perception and misperception of the offense-defense balance to explain alliance
 patterns in nineteenth- and twentieth-century Europe. In contrast to Waltz and traditional realists,
 however, Christensen and Snyder do not view perceptions as endogenous to power (or as a
 random product of uncertainty), but as the result of the lessons of past wars and the relative
 domestic power of civilians and the military. Their aspiration to synthesize different theories and
 levels of analysis is a progressive step more generally-a point to which we return in the final
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 contemporary Germany and Japan are not polar powers because they choose
 not to have military power. This, he argues, is not solely because they are status
 quo powers, but because of specific path-dependent beliefs about the efficacy
 of force. In this, Schweller would appear to join ranks with culturalists like
 Thomas Berger and Peter Katzenstein in arguing that German and Japanese
 antimilitarism results from the socially embedded lessons of World War II, not
 current strategic opportunities and constraints.88 Zakaria's study suggests the
 centrality of a "cultural paradigm shift" in the ideas that underlay how Ameri-
 cans thought about foreign policy-a shift he leaves unexplained.89 In turning
 to culture, Zakaria joins the long tradition of realists who find U.S. foreign
 policy anomalous because "realism is largely alien to American culture."90 We
 can more closely observe the shift from realism to epistemic theory in consid-
 ering the work of Stephen Walt and William Wohlforth.
 STEPHEN WALT ON ALLIANCES. Stephen Walt is an effective critic of neoreal-
 ism, which he considers too spare to explain balancing behavior accurately He
 therefore seeks to supplant "balance-of-power" theory with "balance-of-
 threat" theory. Alliances are triggered by imbalances of "threat," not imbal-
 ances of "power." Unlike the concept of power, the concept of external "threat"
 includes "perceived state intentions" alongside more clearly realist variables
 like economic resources, military technology, and geography Walt goes on to
 demonstrate convincingly that the primary purpose of alliances is to balance,
 not to bandwagon against threats-an important contribution.
 Walt explicitly labels this move as a progressive and parsimonious revision
 of realist balance-of-power theory9l Yet "balance-of-threat" theory in fact sac-
 section. Yet there remains considerable ambiguity whether Christensen and Snyder believe this is
 a "progressive problem shift" within the realist paradigm or a form of theory synthesis. Certainly
 they are often cited as realists (e.g., Grieco, "Realist International Theory," p. 181). Either way,
 Christensen and Snyder clearly demonstrate the fundamental limits not just of neorealist theory
 but of the realism paradigm more broadly. Thomas J. Christensen and Jack Snyder, "Chain Gangs
 and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity," International Organization, Vol. 44,
 No. 2 (Spring 1990), pp. 144, 166; Christensen, "Perceptions and Alliances in Europe," International
 Organization, Vol. 51, No. 1 (Winter 1997), p. 65; and Christensen and Snyder, "Progressive Research
 and Degenerate Alliances," pp. 920-921.
 88. Schweller, Deadly Imbalances, pp. 19, 88, 164-168, 200.
 89. In an otherwise highly complimentary review, historian Walter McDougall calls our attention
 to precisely this empirical indeterminacy. McDougall, "American Empire: Review of Fareed
 Zakaria, From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America's World Role," New York Times Book
 Reviezv, May 3, 1998, p. 25.
 90. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," p. 376.
 91. For specific claims of a progressive shift, see Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca,
 N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1987), pp. viii, 5, 21, 263-265. The underlying problem is that a
 prediction of balancing is not unique to realism. Nearly all international relations paradigms and
 theories predict that states align and balance against threats to the realization of one's interests,
 whether the latter are status quo or revisionist. Why else would a rational government form a
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 rifices the theoretical coherence and distinctiveness not just of neorealism, but
 of realist theory more broadly By combining exogenous changes in power and
 state perceptions of the intentions of others into a single variable, Walt's
 "balance-of-threat" approach excludes virtually no potential cause of rational
 balancing short of irrational, altruistic, or incoherent state action.92 Combining
 intentions and power into dimensions of a single variable without an a priori
 weighting, numerous critics have observed, is a source of fundamental inde-
 terminacy Walt himself concedes that "one cannot determine a priori ... which
 sources of threat will be most important in any given case."93 An example is
 his analysis of the Cold War bipolar balance in Europe-arguably the most
 important single set of alliances in the twentieth century and a "critical" realist
 case. Perceived state intentions (and geography) reverse the predictions de-
 rived from pure power balancing, thereby leading country after country to side
 with the overwhelming U.S.-led coalition. Absent a clear weighting of factors,
 how are we to judge (even in principle) whether this confirms or disconfirms
 Walt's basic theory?
 Having cast the theoretical net so widely, Walt necessarily encounters
 difficulty clearly defining plausible alternative theories (neorealism aside)
 against which to test his own. At first glance, he appears to treat ideology as
 an alternative explanation. Yet in fact Walt rejects only very primitive forms of
 ideological motivation almost absent from international relations theory, nota-
 bly that governments ally with those who espouse similar formal ideological
 doctrines.94 "Balance-of-threat" theory subsumes most other ideological argu-
 military alliance? Theories differ in their predictions about conditions under which states balance.
 Liberal theories predict balancing against "aggressor" states, institutionalist theories predict bal-
 ancing within institutions, epistemic and some constructivist theories predict balancing where it
 is perceived as efficacious, and realist theories predict balancing against power.
 92. For a striking statement, see ibid., p. 149: "In the Arab world, the most important source of
 power has been the ability to manipulate one's own image and the images of one's rivals in the
 minds of other Arab elites. . . . We are therefore dealing with two broad types of balancing:
 balancing conducted by military means [and] balancing conducted by political means directed at
 an opponent's image and legitimacy" There remains ambiguity about whether perceptions of
 intentions involve basic variations in preferences or beliefs about such intentions-the heart of
 which lies in the lack of theoretical constraint Walt is able to impose on "state intentions."
 93. Ibid., p. 22. Our criticism is not simply this indeterminacy, but that his concept of "threat"
 subsumes all but the most implausible of prevailing rationalist explanations. Ibid., p. 26. Waltz
 takes a similar view, arguing that Walt (like Schweller and others) should not be seen as "increasing
 the explanatory power of defective theory and making it more precise," but bringing in extra-theo-
 retical variables. "Walt," he writes, "[has] unfortunately taken the imaginative application of the
 theory to be a new one." Waltz, "Evaluating Theories," p. 916. See also Gunther Hellmann and
 Reinhard Wolf, "Neorealism, Neoliberal Institutionalism, and the Future of NATO," Security Stud-
 ies, Vol. 3, No. 1 (Autumn 1993), pp. 3-43.
 94. Douglas J. MacDonald's review in Journal of Politics, Vol. 51, No. 2 (August 1989), p. 796,
 accuses Walt of employing a "rigid" definition. Walt acknowledges, for example, that the Soviet
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 ments (as a primary source of "state intentions"), in particular the claim-far
 more common in the international relations literature-that states ally against
 ideologies perceived as "aggressive" and with those perceived as "unthreaten-
 ing." Factors such as Pan-Arabism in the Middle East, Hitler's expansionist
 view of security before and during World War II, and "the divisive character of
 Soviet Marxist-Leninism . .. an ideology calling for the authoritative leader-
 ship of the Socialist system by Moscow" play central causal roles in his
 empirical explanations.95
 Of more concern than the indeterminacy of Walt's theory is its appropriation
 of nonrealist causal mechanisms. The "aggressive intentions" underlying
 "threats" include precisely those predicted by nearly all nonrealist explana-
 tions of alliance formation. As seen in the examples just cited, interpretations
 of the intentions of others play a central role in the alliances that occur, and
 these are shaped in turn by the compatibility of strategic beliefs and percep-
 tions held by different countries, as epistemic theory predicts. The alliance
 among postwar West European democracies (along with a few noncommunist
 authoritarian states) reflects in large part the perception that they posed less
 of a threat to one another than did the Soviet Union and its allies-which helps
 reverse the impact of material variables. Walt does not clearly specify whether
 the Western perception of aggressive Soviet intentions is the product of under-
 lying preferences, as liberal theories of peace and war (notably democratic
 peace theory) predict, or of strategic beliefs and perceptions, as epistemic
 theory predicts. We do know, however, that these intentions are exogenous to
 economic capabilities, military technology, and geography-distinctive vari-
 ables in traditional realist theory What is gained by terming this unwieldy
 synthesis a progressive extension of "realism," thereby impeding any possible
 empirical challenge from more plausible nonrealist explanations?
 WILLIAM WOHLFORTH ON THE END OF THE COLD WAR The centrality of per-
 ceptions and beliefs-and thus epistemic theory-is even clearer in William
 Wohlforth's analysis of Soviet (and U.S.) policy during the Cold War.96 Like
 Zakaria, Wohlforth argues that state behavior is shaped most fundamentally
 Union allied with leftist regimes in the Middle East and the United States did not, but he does
 not treat such actions as ideologically motivated because neither superpower demanded that its
 allies alter their domestic policies.
 95. Walt, The Origins of Alliances, pp. 149, 168, 266; and Stephen M. Walt, "Alliance Formation and
 the Balance of World Politics," in Brown, Lynn-Jones, and Miller, The Perils of Anarchy, pp. 214, 243
 (emphasis in original).
 96. We set aside another problem, namely Wohlforth's evident reliance on a distinction between
 status quo and revisionist states as a "contextual" factor explaining Soviet preferences and, in
 particular, the absence of a "World War Ill." As we have already discussed degeneration into liberal
 theory, we focus here on Wohlforth's overt perceptual challenge to objective power analysis in
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 not by exogenous variation in objective power, but in varying perceptions of
 power. Unlike Zakaria, however, who employs perceptions of ruling elites
 primarily as a method to observe the working of more fundamental variables,
 Wohlforth asserts that perceptions are exogenous variables, systematically
 skewed and of great causal importance. This becomes the centerpiece of his
 theoretical innovation.97 Objective power shifts, he argues, "can account nei-
 ther for the Cold War nor its sudden end." Either objective measures of power
 are "not even roughly accurate indicators" of true power or "power does not
 matter."98 The end of the Cold War, Wohlforth contends, is instead a story
 about reactions to (often questionable) perceptions of power.
 If perceptions and power diverge, however, power no longer necessarily
 serves as the primary independent variable driving state behavior. If both
 power and beliefs about power matter, it becomes unclear in principle when
 one or the other predominates. The coherence of the realist core is eroded.
 Insofar as Wohlforth seeks to render this problematic mix determinate-and
 careful historical reconstruction is an unambiguous strength of his work-he
 does so by replacing realist variables and causal mechanisms with those drawn
 from existing epistemic and liberal theories. Wohlforth generally views states
 as being guided by embedded beliefs about foreign policy that are relatively
 resistant to change, even when experience with the material environment
 clearly signals the need for it.
 Consider, for example, Wohlforth's explanation of the timing of the sudden
 Soviet perception of decline in the late 1980s that, in his view, brought the Cold
 War to an end. He relies on four concrete causal mechanisms, at least three of
 which (and perhaps all four) are more consistent with international relations
 paradigms other than realism. The first and ambiguous factor is the "scientific-
 technical revolution," which sparked a desire to reform the socialist economies.
 It is unclear whether Wohlforth views this as a straightforward source of
 material weakness, as realist theory would have it; or as a shift in the dominant
 models and standards for economic growth, as epistemic theory would predict;
 or as a qualitative change in domestic views about the need to link economic
 modernization with an opening to the West, as liberal theory would suggest.99
 William C. Wohlforth, "Realism and the End of the Cold War," in Brown, Lynn-Jones, and Miller,
 The Perils of Anarchy, pp. 32, 36-37.
 97. William C. Wohlforth, The Elusive Balance: Power and Perceptions during the Cold War (Ithaca,
 N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1993), pp. 1-17.
 98. Wohlforth, "Realism and the End of the Cold War," p. 41.
 99. Wohlforth, The Elusive Balance, pp. 233-234, 242-243, 251; and Wohlforth, "Realism and the End
 of the Cold War," pp. 19-22, 37.
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 Whereas it remains unclear whether Wohlforth's first factor is realist, the
 remaining three clearly are not.100 One was that the Soviet Union from Joseph
 Stalin through Leonid Brezhnev was guided by a "correlation-of-forces" theory
 that not only saw capitalism as a threat but also held that states bandwagon
 to power, especially military power. This led successive leaders to discount
 evidence of Soviet decline. Perceptions and ideas suddenly shifted in the late
 1980s because of the endogenous dynamics of epistemic structures. The corre-
 lation of forces model, he argues, became so entrenched and formalized that
 it generated excessive expectations, making it more vulnerable to sudden
 change from failed predictions.101 Still another factor was the new role of the
 United States in the 1980s, which no longer "buttressed" the Soviet perception
 of well-being by treating it as a rising power whose interests had to be
 accommodated.102 Does this reasoning not reduce relative power to whatever
 one's enemy acknowledges it to be-a theme more constructivist than realist?
 The final factor was the formation of an overwhelming balance of power
 against the Soviet Union, in which revolutions in East Central Europe consti-
 tuted the final, decisive steps.103 East European revolutions, Wohlforth argues,
 had a symbolic effect on Soviet power perceptions because they "began to call
 socialism's vitality into question." Such an explanation faces precisely the
 difficulties that plague Walt's theory of alliances. Like Walt, Wohlforth offers
 neither a distinctively realist explanation for why an ever-expanding anti-So-
 viet coalition should form nor, more fundamentally, an explanation for why
 changes in regime type should influence state calculations. Why do East Euro-
 pean governments not move toward the Soviet Union as it declines and
 mellows? Moreover, Wohlforth treats the Soviet policy choice-its withdrawal
 from Eastern Europe and opening to the West-as one designed to induce
 changes in Western perceptions of the Soviet threat, rather than to alter the
 balance of power.104 But what is realist about this world in which imbalances,
 images, and internal politics override sober calculations of relative power?
 100. For a presentation of a clearer realist argument, see Stephen G. Brooks and William C.
 Wohlforth, "How Identities Change: Material Forces, Identity Transformation, and the End of the
 Cold War," unpublished manuscript, March 1999.
 101. Wohlforth, The Elusive Balance, pp. 52-53, 220-229, 250.
 102. Wohlforth, "Realism and the End of the Cold War," pp. 21-22, 32-35.
 103. Ibid., pp. 23, 34, 38-39.
 104. Ibid., p. 23. It remains unclear whether Wohlforth means to argue that regime type actually
 shifted East European policies, or shifted Soviet perception of its relative power. Either way, the
 connection to relative power capabilities-even understood in a more fine-grained sense-remains
 unclear. Wohlforth also stresses the unintended consequences of Soviet policy shifts, particularly
 in Eastern Europe.
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 FROM REALISM TO REGIME THEORY: POWER IS WHAT STATES AGREE IT TO BE
 The realist assumption that the distribution of material resources is the critical
 exogenous variable determining state behavior implies not only that the ac-
 tions of states remain uninfluenced by variation in state preferences or beliefs,
 but that such actions remain essentially uninfluenced by international institu-
 tions. In the realist view, governments cannot induce changes in their relative
 influence by entering into multilateral commitments. From Bismarckian criti-
 cisms of the nineteenth-century Concert of Europe to Mearsheimer's criticism
 of contemporary regime theory, realists have delighted in demonstrating that
 international institutions reflect and ratify, but do not transform, existing
 power relations. Those who believe otherwise are "legalists." 105
 Yet after rejecting the independent influence of international institutioni s for
 centuries, realists are suddenly embracing "legalism." Recent realist theory not
 only treats international institutions as autonomous forces in world politics,
 but at times views their impact as far stronger, if also far more ad hoc, than
 does conventional regime theory The tendency of recent realists to reverse this
 causal mechanism not only undermines realism's coherence and distinctive-
 ness, but is ultimately parasitic on existing regime theory-not least because
 realists have yet to offer a distinctive theory of why international institutions
 influence state behavior. We illustrate this tendency with examples drawn from
 the prominent work of Joseph Grieco and Charles Glaser.
 JOSEPH GRIECO ON EUROPEAN MONETARY INTEGRATION. A striking example
 of the slide from realist to institutionalist assumptions is found in Joseph
 Grieco's attempt to employ realist theory to explain European integration and,
 more generally, the formation of international economic regimes. For realists,
 the agreement among European Union members at Maastricht in 1991 to move
 to a single currency-Economic and Monetary Union (EMU)-appears anoma-
 lous.106 Absent coercion, how could states primarily concerned with "relative
 gains" ever agree to surrender basic elements of state sovereignty to an ambi-
 tious international institution of this kind?
 105. On Bismarck, see Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994), pp.
 120-131. On the realist view of international law and institutions, see Mearsheimer, "The False
 Promise of International Institutions." Recall that institutionalists adhere to nearly all the same
 assumptions as realists-an underlying state of anarchy, states as rational egotistical actors, sub-
 stantial conflict of interest-but argue that governments faced with collective action problems can
 contract among themselves to mitigate the major disadvantages of anarchy.
 106. Grieco, "Realist International Theory," pp. 184-186. Liberals and institutionalists have rela-
 tively little trouble explaining this outcome. See Andrew Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe: Social
 Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1998).
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 In a bold move, Grieco seeks to extend realist theory to encompass and
 explain such behavior-thereby generating a realist theory of international
 institutions. He proposes the "binding hypothesis," whereby weak states,
 rather than forming a balancing coalition against or submitting to the will of
 a larger state, propose legal commitments that allocate voting rights within
 international institutions so as to redistribute power from the powerful to
 themselves. EMU, he argues, was a Franco-German bargain in which Germany
 surrendered its power to satisfy French and Italian fears that cooperation
 would undermine their power. In sum, international institutions are a means
 of alienating and transferring state power.
 By introducing an autonomous role for international institutions-one even
 more powerful than that institutions play in most conventional studies of
 regimes-Grieco's reformulation sacrifices realism's coherence and distinctive-
 ness. It sacrifices coherence because the analysis rests on contradictory (if
 unstated) sets of assumptions about the constraints on state behavior, most of
 which cannot be traced back to the exogenous impact of relative power.
 According to Grieco's reformulation, institutional commitments might be a
 function of underlying state power, as realists have traditionally argued; or
 they might be a factor alongside state power, as Grieco's case study seems to
 suggest; or they might even be a determinant of state power, as the binding
 hypothesis suggests.107 Because these contradictory directions of causality co-
 exist, Grieco's formulation of realism subsumes the entire universe of interna-
 tional relations theories about international institutions. Thus a government
 facing a powerful country may balance against it, submit to its demands, or
 contract with it. Bargaining outcomes and institutional commitments may
 favor strong states or weak states. International commitments may be credible
 or not. No rational state calculations, strategies, or outcomes are privileged or
 excluded. Grieco offers no assumptions specifying even in principle where to
 look for causal mechanisms, antecedent conditions, or weighting of competing
 considerations that would render these predictions more determinate in any
 specific case. As Grieco himself concedes, realist predictions about ongoing
 negotiations over EMU are therefore fundamentally indeterminate.108
 107. Joseph M. Grieco, "State Interests and Institutional Rule Trajectories: A Neorealist Interpreta-
 tion of the Maastricht Treaty and European Economic and Monetary Union," in Frankel, Realism,
 pp. 287-290.
 108. Grieco, with admirable honesty, concedes the indeterminacy: "It will be of intense interest to
 students of international politics," he concludes, "to observe whether institutions [i.e., Grieco's
 binding hypothesis] or underlying differentials of power [i.e., the conventional realist argument]
 will have a greater impact on the future course of European monetary affairs." Ibid., p. 304. Yet
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 To explain outcomes so clearly at variance with traditional realist premises,
 Grieco further sacrifices realism's distinctiveness by invoking basic assump-
 tions and causal processes central to nonrealist paradigms. To explain the main
 puzzle of EMU from a realist perspective-why in a world of relative-gains
 seekers, powerful states (in this case, Germany) would agree, uncoerced, to
 alienate sovereignty-Grieco is forced to reintroduce absolute gains and mis-
 perceptions. Having rejected the possibility that Germany was "balancing"
 against the United States, he concludes that there must have been common
 gains, or that either Germany or its partners (or both) misperceived the true
 costs of EMU. To explain why the commitments of Germany and others are
 credible, moreover, Grieco relies implicitly on the notion that institutions
 strengthen the credibility of commitments-the core prediction of functional
 regime theory Yet he neither acknowledges the transaction-cost logic of func-
 tional regime theory nor provides an explicit alternative to it. Behind the
 rhetoric, realism has been transformed into its nemesis.109
 CHARLES GLASER ON SIGNALING AND ARMS CONTROL. Charles Glaser has ad-
 vanced a sophisticated synthetic view, termed "contingent realism." Part of his
 argument is designed to show that a stable world in which states signal
 peaceful intent and engage in tacit or formal arms control is consistent with
 realist theory. Here Glaser, like Grieco, shifts the analytical focus from causal
 reliance on exogenous variation in the distribution of capabilities to exogenous
 variation in the international informational and institutional environment.
 Glaser aims to show that even if we adopt structural realist assumptions,
 cooperation is much more likely than realists commonly assume and can be
 substantially assisted by international regimes. Glaser's argument is overtly
 functional. International institutions provide information to states that helps
 them to realize common interests and joint gains.
 in a realist theory of European integration in the 1990s, shouldn't the outcome of EMU be a decisive
 theoretical prediction, not a matter of empirical happenstance?
 109. Grieco, "Realist International Theory," pp. 185-186; and Grieco, "State Interests and Institu-
 tional Rule Trajectories," p. 286. Grieco rightly observes that the historical record does not confirm
 that initial and ongoing support for the agreement by the most powerful government, that of
 Germany (rather than imposing an institutional solution on weaker countries) can be explained as
 an effort to balance against U.S. monetary power. Grieco invokes at various points the claim that
 EMU generates absolute gains (as liberals maintain) and that Germany or others may have
 misperceived the likely economic outcome (as epistemic theory might suggest), or because inter-
 national institutions enhance the credibility of national commitments (as institutionalists maintain).
 He also argues that Germany was forced to grant a quid pro quo in exchange for German
 unification, but this flies in the'face of a growing consensus that the German commitment to move
 to EMU began months, even years, before reunification, and did not weaken when reunification
 was complete. For a review of the evidence, see Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe, chap. 6.
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 To explain how and predict when this will occur, Glaser adds an exogenous
 variable to realism's concern with relative power: transaction costs.110 To mini-
 mize conflict, Glaser assumes, states must establish their own defensive inten-
 tions and reduce uncertainty about whether other states are "greedy"-that is,
 whether they prefer more than just security While unilateral policies may
 sometimes achieve the same end, formal international institutions (i.e., arms
 control regimes) may help states achieve this efficiently by signaling or enhanc-
 ing the credibility of commitments through monitoring.111 According to Glaser,
 "Institutions ... that provide information and reduce transaction costs ... do
 not pose a problem for structural realism. Nothing about the roles performed
 by this type of institution conflicts with structural realism's basic assump-
 tions." Glaser's argument is that tacit coordination or perhaps formal interna-
 tional institutions can be employed to generate joint gains where the
 transaction costs of decentralized signaling, coordination, and monitoring are
 high.
 Yet if Glaser's reformulation of realism encompasses not only the distribu-
 tion of military power, but also exogenous variation in costs-and implicitly
 admits, albeit as a nonrealist factor, the role of "greedy" states-does it not
 encompass the assumptions of the institutionalist paradigm? Has it become a
 generic commitment not to a distinct realist theory, but simply to a lowest-
 common-denominator rationalism? Acknowledging that contingent realism
 might appear overly broad-a dilution rather than a deepening of realist
 premises-Glaser explicitly seeks to establish his realist credentials by demon-
 strating that "contingent realism" does not change "states' motives . . . to
 altruism" or grant "tremendous control to an international authority" Yet this
 only serves to demonstrate the difficulty contemporary realists face, once
 having appropriated (but not theoretically subsumed) nearly all rationalist
 alternatives, in locating plausible competing theories. Glaser's alternatives are
 straw men. Both altruism and a world state have been utterly absent from
 scholarly debates for nearly half a century 112 Neither is advocated or analyzed
 110. Glaser is ambiguous on the role of motives. In "Realists as Optimists," pp. 394-397, he argues
 that "contingent realism suggests the importance of motives" and renders standard power vari-
 ables "less important." In Charles L. Glaser, "The Security Dilemma Revisited," World Politics, Vol.
 50, No. 1 (October 1997), p. 191, he argues, "contrary to the standard [realist] argument, countries
 should not focus solely on capabilities, but also on motives." Kydd, "Sheep in Sheep's Clothing,"
 p. 17, brings the distinction between democracy and nondemocracy, as well as variation in
 ideology, to explain such behavior.
 111. Glaser, "Realists as Optimists," p. 410ff.
 112. Ibid., p. 411. Another example is Mearsheimer's detailed refutation of collective security
 theory, yet Mearsheimer cites very few, if any, clear advocates of collective security (as opposed
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 in any significant contemporary institutionalist or liberal scholarship-a hand-
 ful of recent writings on altruistic motives for human rights or environmental
 activism aside. More specifically, is not the effort to show that largely realist
 assumptions generate predictions of cooperation, even institutionalization, the
 central premise of Keohane's seminal statement of institutionalism in After
 Hegemony? And is Keohane's theoretical solution drawn from the transaction-
 cost economics of Oliver Williamson not identical to Glaser's?113 What is
 gained by terming all these competing rationalist claims "realist"?
 Practical Advantages and Broader Implications:
 Why Reformulate Realism?
 The works considered above make innovative and valuable contributions to
 scholarly understanding of world politics, particularly at the level of midrange
 propositions. There is much to be said in defense of their empirical insights
 and midlevel theorizing, which we have necessarily slighted here. They belong
 among the most fruitful advances in recent international relations scholarship.
 Yet the fact that scholars working under a particular label produce interesting
 empirical insights is not the only criterion by which to judge a theoretical
 paradigm. The question is not simply whether such authors provide interesting
 explanations, but what their findings tell us more generally about world
 politics.
 A causal reading of recent realist research would lead one to believe that
 realists have successfully found innovative ways to build on core realist as-
 sumptions to explain new aspects of world politics. Yet if the true assumptions
 and causal mechanisms underlying much recent realist research by self-styled
 realists was made explicit, we have argued, realism's affinity with existing
 liberal, epistemic, and institutionalist theories of world politics would become
 clear. This systematic mislabeling of findings has tended to isolate realists from
 important trends in international relations theory. In lieu of fully theorizing
 factors like domestic preferences, collective epistemes, and international insti-
 tutions, many realists are tempted to deny that any true theories (e.g., of
 domestic politics) are possible. Rose goes so far, in his prominent review essay,
 to proclaim this unwillingness to theorize domestic politics fully as a defining
 virtue of contemporary realism-a claim for which he cites Aristotle.114 Yet
 to concerts or regimes) after the 1950s. Robert Keohane explicitly rejects such an "idealist" account.
 Keohane, After Hegemony, pp. 59-60 n. 2.
 113. On Williamsonian theory, see Keohane, After Hegemony.
 114. See n. 60.
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 little is gained by distinguishing realism as a theory, only to reintroduce liberal,
 epistemic, and institutionalist arguments in a vaguer form by loosening the
 specification of core concepts. At best this is insular, at worst quite misleading.
 Scholars would benefit if the role of these factors, and the assumptions about
 world politics on which they rest, were made explicit, and theories were
 grouped accordingly. More rigorous and consistent links between hypotheses
 and underlying assumptions would clarify the landscape of international rela-
 tions theory Our general theoretical understanding would, for example, be
 quite different if the work of Snyder on imperialism, Grieco on relative gains,
 Van Evera on war, and Zakaria or Schweller on national expansion were
 treated-as their assumptions demand-as part of the same liberal research
 program that has given rise to theories of the democratic peace and commercial
 policy.
 Yet the issue here is not just the provision of a simpler and more accurate
 guide to the actual assumptions of major international relations theories, im-
 portant though that goal may be. Like the authors of the articles we examine
 above-all of whom took great care to underscore the realist nature of their
 claims-we believe that proper definition of basic theories has practical impli-
 cations for theoretical debates, empirical research, and pedagogy. Specifically,
 we believe that adherence to our reformulation would facilitate more decisive
 tests among existing theories, define more sharply the empirical domain of
 realist theory, and provide a superior foundation for multicausal synthesis
 between realism and other theories.
 REFOCUSING EMPIRICAL TESTS
 One implication of our proposed reformulation of realism is that its conceptual
 language permits scholars to represent the theoretical implications of ongoing
 empirical research. Testing theories is a way of evaluating the assumptions that
 underlie them. The proper identification of those assumptions is the most
 important reason why the semantics of paradigmatic debates matter. We
 believe that a central issue in international relations today-as it has been for
 200 if not 2,000 years-is to assess the relative influence on world politics of,
 and the interactions among, four factors: the distribution of material resources,
 the distribution of preferences, the distribution of beliefs, and the distribution
 of information. These factors are critical, we submit, regardless of the language
 one uses to describe theories-formal or informal, traditional or modern.
 These four categories-power, preferences, beliefs, and information-roughly
 correspond to the four major categories of modern rationalist international
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 relations theory, namely realist, liberal, epistemic, and institutionalist theo-
 ries.115 These theories correspond also to the four generic determinants of actor
 behavior in fundamental rationalist social theory: resources, tastes, beliefs, and
 institutions.116
 Were empirical research consistently structured around the relative impor-
 tance of (or, as we shall see below, the interaction among) these factors, the
 discourses of major traditions in international relations theory would surely
 become more consistent with one another and with fundamental social theory
 Students of world politics could better judge what is at stake in empirical
 research and theoretical debate. Acceptance of a reformulated realism would
 clarify what is in fact a realist argument and what is not, and thereby refocus
 theoretical debate and empirical research on the enduring issues of world
 politics raised by realism's traditional skepticism of intentions, ideology, and
 institutions. Curiously insular, contemporary realists are strikingly reluctant to
 test their hypotheses against nonrealist theories. Loose formulations of realism
 discourage decisive empirical testing against fundamentally competing ration-
 alist views. Proper paradigmatic definition reveals that the theoretical innova-
 tions in recent defensive and neoclassical realist research in fact confirm
 assumptions and causal mechanisms underlying the liberal, epistemic, and
 institutionalist paradigms more than those underlying the realist paradigm.
 This would open a number of new and compelling areas for empirical
 confrontations among theories that are currently blocked by contempor-
 ary minimal realist formulations. We believe that more fine-grained empiri-
 cal debates would become theoretically inescapable. Consider the following
 possibilities.
 IMPERIALISM. By combining power and preferences in his explanation of
 imperialism, Snyder-as Zakaria observes-blurs the relative importance of
 the two. Subsequent realist studies of expansion, including those by Zakaria
 and Schweller, similarly fail to distinguish the role of power vacuums, on the
 one hand, and "strong" domestic states or "revisionist" aggressors, on the
 other. If scholars explicitly separated, developed, or tested nonrealist theories,
 it would become possible to discern the relative influence of each.
 ALLIANCES. Walt, by structuring his analysis of alliance formation as a di-
 chotomous contest between the "balance of threat," on the one hand, and
 115. For example, Lake and Powell, in Strategic Choice, employ nearly identical categories, but
 different labels.
 116. Coleman, Foundations of Social Theory; and Elster, "Introduction."
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 irrational ideology, on the other, subtly discourages empirical tests of realism
 and alternative explanations. How much of alliance behavior can be explained
 by capabilities, geography, and technology and how much by state "inten-
 tions"? In assessing threat, to what extent should scholars and policymakers
 be concerned about military might and to what extent the management of
 images and the accumulation of cultural capital?
 COOPERATION. Grieco, by structuring discussions of cooperation around the
 dichotomy of "absolute-gains seeking" and "relative-gains seeking," discour-
 ages investigation of competing sources of conflictual ("relative-gains seek-
 ing") behavior. Who is correct-liberals who attribute conflict to deadlocked
 preferences, epistemic theorists who point to conflicting embedded beliefs,
 realists who invoke security externalities, or institutionalists who highlight
 coordination (bargaining) failure? Current realist theory, which combines all
 four into "relative-gains seeking," evades this question. More fine-grained
 studies would provide more insight.
 WAR AND PEACE. In their studies of hot and cold wars, Van Evera and
 Wohlforth focus on power and perceptions of power. In doing so, they either
 subsume or ignore a series of narrower explanations for the beliefs that they
 conclude are at the heart of world politics. Only recently, however, have we
 begun to see focused tests between variants of realist, liberal, epistemic, and
 institutionalist theory.117 More would be welcome.
 HEGEMONY. Scholars have isolated four different variants of hegemonic
 stability theory, each grounded in a separate aspect of international leadership.
 A liberal variant stresses variation in differential competitiveness, an epistemic
 variant looks to shared ideas and beliefs between leader and followers, an
 institutionalist variant emphasizes the provision of institutional infrastructure,
 and a realist variant stresses the hegemonic provision of resources that permits
 "follower" governments to defray the short-term costs of adjustment, in
 exchange for which the hegemon gains influence over the terms of future
 cooperation or benefits from security externalities. As David Lake has ob-
 served, more attention could be paid to the relative power of these four
 explanations.118
 THE VIRTUE OF LIMITS: SPECIFYING REALISM 'S PROPER EXPLANATORY DOMAIN
 Assumptions define the empirical scope of a paradigm. A more precise and
 distinct paradigm, based on more than a minimal commitment to rational state
 117. See, for example, Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace.
 118. Lake, "Leadership, Hegemony, and the International Economy."
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 behavior in anarchy, should thus offer a more precise specification of the
 predicted empirical domain of realist theories. Most realists today, we have
 seen, assert that realist hypotheses should always enjoy analytical priority-
 at least wherever security issues are involved.119 Yet, no single theory can
 or should claim to explain all of world politics or to be empirically preeminent
 under all circumstances. Assertions of blanket preeminence undermine
 the credibility of modern realism, whereas acceptance of assumptions that
 impose explicit constraints on empirical domain would be a sign of theoretical
 maturity
 The three assumptions we propose in the first section of this article suggest
 a more sharply defined domain than that claimed by contemporary realists,
 yet one that eliminates many apparent realist anomalies. Realist theory does
 not apply across the board to security affairs. It is appropriate instead only to
 those cases marked by severe underlying conflict of interest (economic, ideo-
 logical, or political) relative to the cost of overt coercion or inducement. If the
 underlying preferences at stake are weak or the relative cost of exercising
 power is high, states will have little incentive to threaten or provoke overt
 coercion or inducement, and the outcome of conflict is more likely to reflect
 an institutionalized focal point (as institutionalists argue), concordant/discor-
 dant causal beliefs (as epistemic analysts argue), or the relative preference
 intensity (as liberals argue).120
 For the realist link between total resources and bargaining outcomes to hold,
 both parties must consider that the issues at stake are of paramount impor-
 tance. Realist claims should therefore be limited to circumstances in which
 states are motivated by strong and symmetrical underlying conflicts in prefer-
 ences-overlapping territorial, economic, or ideological claims-or situations
 where the cost of coercion is so low (at least to one party) that its cost-effective
 use is feasible. This explains why security disputes among advanced industrial
 democracies tend to be resolved nonmilitarily-a liberal prediction consistent
 with the near total suppression of realist politics among them observed by
 Schweller, Snyder, Grieco, Van Evera, and others.121 In such cases, realist theory
 119. Waltz, Theory of International Politics; Mearsheimer, "False Promise of International Institu-
 tions," p. 351; and Charles Lipson, "International Cooperation in Economic and Security Affairs,"
 in Baldwin, Neorealism and Neoliberalism, pp. 60-84.
 120. We should expect war and realist security dynamics, for example, only involving at least one
 state sufficiently "aggressive" to raise "vital" interests for all involved. Here we find support from
 Schweller, "New Realist Research on Alliances," pp. 928-929. For a classic statement of this
 position, see also Stanley Hoffmann, Duties beyond Borders: On the Limits and Possibilities of an Ethical
 International Politics (Syracuse, N.Y: Syracuse University Press, 1981), pp. 14-16.
 121. We have noted these examples above. Such scholars voice criticisms of what they take to be
 liberal views, but they tend to take the form of either skepticism that democracies are stable or
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 is not disconfirmed, but is simply inappropriate, because its assumptions are
 not met. Similarly, in cases where the stakes are asymmetrical-for example,
 the Boer War, Hitler's remilitarization of the Rhineland, and more recent
 peripheral conflicts in Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Chechnya-an intense pref-
 erence or "political will" concerning the particular issue at stake can compen-
 sate for a deficiency in capabilities.122 Specifying the proper domain of realist
 theory is thus a means not only to constrain realism, but also to strengthen it
 by limiting claims to domains where it should be expected to apply A leaner
 realism may be meaner.
 BEYOND MONOCAUSAL MANIA: MOVING TOWARD THEORY SYNTHESIS
 Some readers may object that debates about the accuracy and scope of uni-
 causal explanations of world politics are unnecessarily limited. Is it realistic to
 maintain that patterns of important, complex events in world politics are the
 result of a single factor? Is not theory synthesis the real goal of the defensive
 and neoclassical realists we critique, however they label their empirical claims?
 Doesn't excessive attention to "isms" encourage sectarian and semantic battles
 among schools that would be better treated as elements within broader inte-
 grated explanations? Isn't this the implication even of our own specification of
 realism in terms of interstate bargaining?
 We agree. Our purpose in this article is not to freeze the lines between
 unicausal paradigms. The replacement of what John Ruggie has termed
 "monocausal mania" with such multicausal, even multiparadigmatic synthe-
 ses, we believe, is desirable, even imperative. It is the future of international
 relations theory. The unavoidable first step, however, is to develop a set of
 well-constructed first-order theories. Multicausality without a rigorous under-
 lying structure only muddies the waters, encouraging ad hoc argumentation
 and obscuring the results of empirical tests.123
 We submit, moreover, that a major advantage, perhaps the most important
 one, of our proposed reformulation of the definition of realism is that it
 suggests an easily operationalizable and internally coherent mechanism for
 concerns about the transition to democracy, neither of which supports realist claims against liberal
 ones.
 122. Moravcsik, "Taking Preferences Seriously," pp. 523-524. See also Posen, The Sources of Military
 Doctrine, pp. 60-61; Morrow, "Social Choice and System Structure," pp. 83-84; and Andrew Mack,
 "Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetrical Conflict," World Politics, Vol. 27,
 No. 2 (January 1975), pp. 175-200.
 123. John Ruggie, personal communication. For a view that one theory must dominate, see Ethan
 B. Kapstein, "Is Realism Dead? The Domestic Sources of International Politics," International
 Organization, Vol. 49, No. 4 (Autumn 1995), pp. 751-774.
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 synthesizing realism with other theories. This mechanism we have termed the
 "two-stage" or "two-step" method.124 The two-stage or two-step method as-
 sumes, as any rationalist (or boundedly rational) theory of state behavior must,
 that in world politics in which states are the relevant actors, the domestic and
 transnational state-society relations of preference and belief formation can be
 analytically separated from the strategic logic of interstate interaction, whether
 explained by realism or institutionalism. If we understand international rela-
 tions as a bargaining problem, as realists do, theories that account for the
 distribution and intensity of national preferences (in Krasner's much-cited
 application of bargaining theory, the shape and location of the Pareto frontier)
 are distinct from theories of bargaining and collective action (which concern
 how to "get to" or "move along" the Pareto frontier).125
 Two implications follow from this dichotomy. First, each major international
 relations theory paradigm enjoys a comparative advantage in explaining a
 different input into the bargaining game. Liberal and liberal constructivist
 theories focus on exogenous variation in underlying state preferences (not
 policies or strategies); hence the analyst concerned with the causes and conse-
 quences of variation in state preferences will find liberal theory most useful.
 Epistemic theories highlight exogenous variation in collective beliefs that guide
 actors in their pursuit of goals; hence the analyst concerned with the causes
 and consequences of changing conceptions of means-ends relations or the
 boundedness of rationality will find such theories most useful. Both realist and
 institutionalist theories, by contrast, take specific configurations of state pref-
 erences and beliefs as given and focus on the impact of exogenous variation
 in external systemic constraints-resources in the case of realists and informa-
 tion in the case of institutionalists. For the analyst interested in explaining
 varying outcomes where preferences and beliefs are fixed, the interaction logic
 of realist or institutionalist theory may be more useful.
 The second implication of the two-stage or two-step method is that it sug-
 gests a more defensible and internally consistent approach to theory synthesis
 than that commonly employed today Most leading contemporary scholars-
 including Waltz, Keohane, and those whose work we analyze in this article-
 recommend that we synthesize theories by automatically considering realism
 first (with preferences assumed to be invariant) and then introducing compet-
 ing theories of preference or belief change as needed to explain residual
 variance: "Liberalism . . . makes sense . . . within the explanatory constraints
 124. Legro, "International Cooperation Two-step"; and Moravcsik, "Taking Preferences Seriously."
 125. Krasner, "Global Communications and National Power."
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 imposed by realism"126 or "When realist theories are found wanting, we should
 supplement them with new culturalist theories."127 This conventional proce-
 dure, we have argued in detail elsewhere, lacks any coherent methodological
 or theoretical justification. Methodologically, it overtly introduces omitted vari-
 able bias by arbitrarily privileging realist explanations of any phenomena
 unicausally explained by realist, liberal, and epistemic theories, without ever
 testing the latter two explanations. Theoretically, the conventional approach
 contradicts its own assumption of state rationality and fixed preferences, which
 implies precisely the opposite: If preferences and beliefs vary across states and
 issues, we must first explain how they vary.128
 It is important to recognize, of course, that as one moves away from static
 decisions toward long-term change, the explanatory domains suggested by the
 two-step method-liberalism explains preferences, epistemic theories explain
 beliefs, whereas realism or institutionalism help explain strategic interaction
 based on resources and information-become increasingly dependent on spe-
 cific empirical attributes of the situation. A dynamic view opens up more
 complicated linkages among the various elements of rationalist theory From
 Otto Hintze to Charles Tilly, realists have made a case for preference and
 identity formation via a particular subset of "second-image reversed" argu-
 ments. They maintain that conflict and war have definitively shaped states and
 their desires, such that the very identity and preferences of states adapt over
 time.129 Similarly Barry Posen and John Mearsheimer have argued that collec-
 126. Robert 0. Keohane, "Theory of International Politics: Structural Realism and Beyond," in
 Keohane, ed., Neorealism and Its Critics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990), p. 192. See
 also Stephen Brooks, "Dueling Realisms," International Organization, Vol. 51, No. 3 (Summer 1997),
 pp. 471-472.
 127. Michael C. Desch, "Culture Clash: Assessing the Importance of Ideas in Security Studies,"
 International Security, Vol. 23, No. 1 (Summer 1998), p. 170.
 128. The "two-step" model to explain static bargaining outcomes follows, in our view, directly
 from the rationality assumption shared by realism and most of its basic competitors. As classic
 studies of power by Robert Dahl and others taught us a generation ago, it is impossible to model
 strategic interaction without first determining preferences or beliefs (or both) independently of the
 strategic circumstances. Only where the pattern of preferences is consistent with the realist as-
 sumptions above-preferences are intense, symmetrical, and zero-sum-is it proper even to con-
 sider realist theory. In any other case-say a situation where preferences are compatible or where
 the collective action problem is informational-realism is not simply incorrect; it is completely
 inappropriate. Thus in classical bargaining theory, the locations of ideal points and outside options
 (preferences) are almost always relevant, whereas linkage to threats and inducements are only
 relevant under specific conditions. This mechanism for theory synthesis is the most powerful basic
 tool that rationalist social science theory has developed for this sort theory synthesis.
 129. Otto Hintze, The Historical Essays of Otto Hintze (New York: Oxford University Press, 1975);
 Charles Tilly, ed., The Formation of National States in Western Europe (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
 University Press, 1975); Grieco, "Realist International Theory"; and Layne "Kant or Cant," pp. 326-
 327.
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 tive beliefs-for example, nationalism-can be the product of international
 security competition, not simply of mass culture, societal development, or
 domestic political manipulation.130 Institutionalists both of a regime-theoretical
 and constructivist variety argue that over time institutions can also shape
 preferences and ideas-though as yet there is no theory of this phenomenon.131
 This dynamic view of preference and belief construction may allow for much
 more complex claims about the relationship between realism and its competi-
 tors when studying long-term phenomena-another implication of our refor-
 mulation concerning the empirical scope of different paradigms.
 Still, by clearly specifying the assumptions about state preferences involved,
 our reformulation of realism encourages acceptance of the two-stage or two-
 step synthesis as a first-cut explanation of discrete episodes of state behavior.
 This would, we believe, permit realists who seek to incorporate domestic
 factors to draw more explicitly on vibrant bodies of relevant nonrealist theory,
 such as the literature on the democratic peace, economic interdependence,
 ideas in foreign policy, and credible commitments. Conversely, a clearly
 defined realist theory about the role of material resources in shaping the
 outcome of interstate conflict offers a salutary correction to those liberal,
 epistemic, and institutionalist theories that ignore or attempt to implicitly
 smuggle power into their analysis.
 Conclusion
 Perhaps the most useful way to judge the power of a social scientific paradigm
 is by examining what it is able to exclude. By this standard, the realist para-
 digm is degenerating. Its conceptual foundations are being "stretched" beyond
 all recognition or utility.132 There exists no set of shared nontrivial assumptions
 that can distinguish the arguments shared by realists today. Instead of chal-
 lenging competing liberal, epistemic, and institutional theories, realists now
 regularly seek to subsume their causal mechanisms. Realism has become little
 more than a generic commitment to the assumption of rational state behavior.
 One result is ad hoc appeals to exogenous variation in national preferences,
 beliefs, and international institutions. Others, to be sure, elaborate more de-
 130. Barry R. Posen, "Nationalism, the Mass Army, and Military Power," International Security, Vol.
 18, No. 2 (Fall 1993), pp. 80-124; and Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future."
 131. Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy Is What You Make of It: The Social Construction of Power
 Politics," International Organizatioh, Vol. 46, No. 2 (Spring 1992), pp. 391-425.
 132. On "conceptual stretching," see Sartori, "Concept Misinformation in Comparative Politics,"
 p. 970.
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 tailed midrange causal propositions about the causes and consequences of such
 variation, but the explicitness of these arguments serves only to highlight their
 liberal, institutional, or epistemic provenance. From the perspective of the
 realist paradigm with which we began this article, we ask, "Is anybody still a
 realist?" From the perspective of minimal realism the question becomes: "Is
 everybody now a realist?" Either way, realism is in need of reformulation.
 The tendency to label nearly all rationalist explanations of state behavior
 "realist" misstates the broader significance of the empirical research that self-
 styled realists have recently conducted. Its real significance lies not in the
 revitalization of core realist premises, to which its connection is tenuous at best.
 It lies instead in the empirical validation of assumptions about world politics
 that realists traditionally reject. The mislabeling of realism has obscured the
 major achievement of this research in the 1990s, namely to demonstrate in
 important areas of security studies the explanatory power of liberal, epistemic,
 and institutionalist theories. Here many of the realists considered above, as
 well as critics like Vasquez-all of whom explicitly defend adherence to real-
 ism, despite anomalies, because there appears to exist no alternative para-
 digm-understate the problem.133 The real problem is not simply the use of
 ad hoc arguments to patch anomalies, but the systematic use of arguments
 from existing alternative paradigms.
 Instead of acknowledging this trend, recent realist writings defend it by
 inviting us to return to the early 1940s-a period in which realists such as E.H.
 Carr convinced scholars that the central debate in international relations theory
 should be between "realists," who believe in rationality, prudence, and the
 importance of national self-interest, and "idealists," who believe in the uniform
 harmony of state interests, the power of altruistic motivations, or the possibil-
 ity of world government. Whether this dichotomy was a useful guide fifty
 years ago remains an open question. Its unsuitability today should be obvious
 to all. These two categories are too vague, too broad, too open-ended, too
 normative, and too dismissive of contemporary nonrealist theory to be of much
 use as a guide to social scientific theory and research.134 The major develop-
 ment in international relations theory over the past three decades is instead
 the emergence and firm establishment of more subtly differentiated rationalist
 133. Vasquez, "The Realist Paradigm," pp. 909-911.
 134. Some constructivists seem also to encourage the use of this dichotomy. We have not, however,
 considered a constructivist "theory" here because we take seriously those who warn that "con-
 structivism"-like "materialism," "rationalism," and other such broad categories of social theory-
 does not define a discrete international relations paradigm or theory. It should not, therefore, be
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 theories-variants of liberal, epistemic, and institutionalist theories. These are
 potent competitors to realist claims and should be recognized as such. Any
 categorization of international relations theories that fails to accord these a
 central and distinct place is profoundly misleading.
 One corrective to the degeneration of contemporary realism would be, of
 course, simply to jettison the term altogether. We believe it is too soon to
 contemplate such a radical solution. It would be preferable for realists and their
 interlocutors to observe greater precision in stating and applying its premises.
 A commitment to "realism" should signal far more than a belief in state
 rationality and international anarchy It should mark a commitment to a par-
 ticular rationalist theory of state behavior in anarchy, one stressing the resolu-
 tion of international conflict through the application of material power
 capabilities. The true role of such capabilities can be appreciated only through
 conceptual clarity, not conceptual stretching. Acceptance of our tripartite refor-
 mulation of realism would provide theoretical foundations clearly distinct
 from other rationalist theories, generate crisper empirical predictions, and
 contribute to more rigorous multicausal syntheses. Such a coherent and distinct
 realist paradigm would be fit to assume its rightful role in the study of world
 politics.
 employed as a counterpart to realism, liberalism, institutionalism, or epistemic theory. Construc-
 tivist arguments might be found in any of these categories. A realist versus idealist/constructionist
 dichotomy would thus be unhelpful. See Wendt, "Social Theory and International Politics"; and
 Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,"
 International Organization, Vol. 52, No. 2 (Spring 1998), pp. 890, 909-912.
